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Science, Public Bioethics, and the
Problem of Integration
0. Carter Snead
Public bioethics - the governance of science, medicine, and
biotechnology in the name of ethical goods - is an emerging area of
American law. The field uniquely combines scientific knowledge, moral
reasoning, and prudential judgments about democratic decisionmaking. It
has captured the attention of officials in every branch of government, as
well as the American public itself. Public questions (such as those relating
to the law of abortion, the federal funding of embryonic stem cell research,
and the regulation of end-of-life decisionmaking) continue to roil the
public square.
This Article examines the question of how scientific methods and
principles can and should be integrated into the making and enforcement
of laws in this domain without compromising the integrity of science, the
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democratic legitimacy of government, or both. It identifies, analyzes and
critiques one prominent model of integration, namely, the proposal to
delegate virtually all public bioethical questions to scientific experts for
resolution solely using the tools of their respective disciplines. The Article
argues that this model of integration raises serious prudential concerns
relating to democratic accountability (and thus legitimacy). More deeply,
it argues that the proposal is unsustainable in principle because of the
fundamental conceptual incompatibility between the premises and methods
of modern science and the ethical principles that comprise the currency of
public bioethical deliberation. It concludes by offering a provisional way
forward, arguing that integration should be a function of defining and
policing the boundaries of scientific methods and ethical reasoning,
according to their respective competencies for the particular public
bioethical question at issue. The Article provides an analytic tool to
facilitate this line drawing, and illustrates its application with reference to
several contemporary debates within public bioethics (i.e., the recent FDA
approval of Plan B emergency contraception, the federal funding of
embryonic stem cell research, and the impact of cognitive neuroscience on
theories of criminal punishment).
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[Tihe contradiction between the policy role of scientific
knowledge and the principles of democratic decisionmaking
has emerged as a central structural problem in western
democracies.
- Dorothy Nelkin'
Science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be,
and outside of its domain[,] value judgments of all kinds
remain necessary.
- Albert Einstein
2
Dorothy Nelkin, Scientific Knowledge, Public Policy and Democracy: A Review
Essay, 1 Sci. COMM. 106, 107 (1979).
2 YUVAL LEVIN, IMAGINING THE FuTURE: SCIENCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6
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[S] cience sans conscience n'est que ruyne de l'ame.
- Francois Rabelais 3
INTRODUCTION
Public bioethics - the governance of the practice of medicine,
biotechnology, and biomedical research in the name of ethical goods
- is a relatively young species of law. Nevertheless, over its brief
lifespan, it has had a broad and deep impact in the public square. In
the past decade alone, the American polity has been roiled by political
and legal questions involving: the law of abortion;5 federal funding of
embryonic stem cell research;6  termination of life-sustaining
measures; 7 state, federal, and intergovernmental efforts to ban human
(2008) (quoting Albert Einstein).
3 FRANCOIS RABELAIS, PANTAGRUEL ch. 8 (1532) ("...science without conscience
is but the ruin of the soul.").
4 Bioethicists William F. May, James Childress, and the late John C. Fletcher of
the Center for Humanism in Medicine at the University of Virginia have offered a
similar (though somewhat narrower) definition of "public bioethics," namely, "the
activity of official public bodies established by federal or state governments to address
- in public, with public participation - bioethical issues arising in public policy or
public culture." William F. May et al., Public Bioethics, UNIV. VA. HEALTH SYS. (Oct. 6,
2004), http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/him/publicbioethics.cfm. For a
discussion of the emergence of public bioethics as a form of governance, see infra Part
I (drawing heavily on 0. Carter Snead, Public Bioethics and the Bush Presidency, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867 (2009) [hereinafter Snead, Public Bioethics]). This Article
uses the terms "law" and "governance" interchangeably to refer both to the
deliberative processes of the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal
government, as well as the products that issue therefrom in the form of executive
orders and memoranda, administrative rules, regulations, and statutes.
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519 (2008) (challenging
politicized nature of Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence); Charlie Savage, On
Sotomayor, Some Abortion Rights Backers Are Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at Al
(discussing now-Justice Sotomayor's possible jurisprudential leanings with regard to
abortion); Katherine Q. Seelye et al., On the Issues: Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/abortion.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2010) (contrasting abortion views of 2008 presidential candidates).
6 See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, MONITORING STEM CELL
RESEARCH 2-5 (2004) [hereinafter MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH]; see also Exec.
Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009) (repealing President Bush's
limitations on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research).
7 See, e.g., 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising) Truth About Schiavo: A Defeat for the
Cause of Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2006) (discussing legal and ethical
issues involved in termination of life-sustaining measures); 0. Carter Snead, Dynamic
Complementarity: Terri's Law and Separation of Powers Principles in the End-of-Life
Context, 57 FLA. L. REv. 53 (2005) (same).
[Vol. 43:15291532
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cloning (in some or all its forms);8 Oregon's legal regime for physician
assisted suicide (and Attorney General John Ashcroft's efforts to
nullify it by interpretive rule);9 and federal regulations regarding
conscience protections for healthcare providers.'" It should not be all
that surprising that public bioethics has captured the attention of
lawmakers and citizens alike. Few domains of governance feature the
relationship between law and morality as starkly. In the public
bioethics context, the government deploys its coercive powers in
service of vigorously, often bitterly, contested moral claims about
fundamental human concerns. To what class of individuals should the
law extend its protection? When does the life of such an individual
begin or end? What are the contours of the right to bodily autonomy?
How do judgments about these matters stand in relation to obligations
to alleviate suffering, the freedom to conduct scientific research, or to
practice medicine as one sees fit? These are only a handful of the
vexing moral questions at the heart of public bioethics.
Advances in biomedical science and biotechnology are, in an
obviously causal sense, the reason that public bioethics emerged as a
branch of governance in the first instance. But how should (or can)'
those charged with making or enforcing the law integrate the
premises, methods, and findings of science itself into public bioethical
deliberations? More pointedly, how can such officials fruitfully
integrate science into public bioethics without compromising the
integrity of science, the democratic legitimacy of government, or both?
The aim of this Article is to explore this "problem of integration," to
articulate its complexities, and to offer a provisional way forward. It
will examine one particularly prominent model of integration (termed
here the "Maximal Deference" approach). Under this proposed
approach, public officials delegate virtually all public bioethical
questions to scientific experts, who will ostensibly appeal only to the
tools of their respective disciplines to adjudicate the contested public
8 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN
DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 19-33 (2002) [hereinafter HUMAN CLONING] (discussing
efforts in United States to ban cloning); Nigel M. de S. Cameron & Anna V.
Henderson, Brave New World at the General Assembly: The United Nations Declaration
on Human Cloning, 9(1) MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 145, 148 (2008) (discussing history
and content of 2005 United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning).
' See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-60 (2006) (invalidating interpretive
rule as beyond Attorney General's statutory authority).
10 See, e.g., Rescission of the Regulation Entitled "Ensuring that Department of
Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory
Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law," 74 Fed. Reg. 10207-01, 10208
(proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
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questions at issue." The Article argues that the Maximal Deference
model of integration raises serious prudential concerns relating to
democratic accountability (and thus legitimacy). More deeply, it
argues that this model is unsustainable in principle because certain
key premises and methods of modern science are incompatible with
the ethical principles that comprise the currency of public bioethical
deliberation. The Article concludes by offering a provisional way
forward. This proposal holds that integration should be a function of
defining and policing the boundaries of scientific methods and ethical
reasoning according to their respective competencies for the particular
public bioethical question at issue.
To this end, the Article will proceed in the following manner. Part I
explores the evolution of public bioethics as a form of governance in
the United States. Part II identifies and explains the Maximal
Deference model and discusses its historical origins. As a first step in
critiquing the Maximal Deference model, Part III will provide a
necessarily compressed and abstracted account of modern science as a
mechanism for the active production of a narrowly circumscribed yet
extremely powerful and useful kind of knowledge. 2 Specifically, it will
discuss certain key premises and methods of modern scientific
reasoning that render it unfit to supply answers to normative
questions, namely, the commitments to physicalism, reductive
mechanism, and strict adherence to clear epistemic rules.
Drawing on the foregoing discussion, Part IV argues that the
Maximal Deference model is unsound. Procedurally, delegating
bioethical questions to scientists creates serious problems for
democratic accountability, and thus legitimacy. More importantly, this
model fails in principle because key premises and methods of scientific
reasoning are incommensurable with the humanistic principles that
comprise the currency of public bioethical deliberation. The costs of
ignoring this problem of incommensurability are grave. They include,
for example, the risks of smuggling unstated humanistic principles
into the governing process. Worse still, deferring to science alone to
settle bioethical disputes could flatten or jettison essential humanistic
"l Whether the Maximal Deference model of integration is put forth in the public
square as a serious proposal or as a mere rhetorical tactic is not entirely clear. As will
be discussed in Part II, infra, this model is one that is routinely invoked by public
figures, and it is rooted in a vision of governance that has been present since before
this nation's inception. Accordingly, this Article aims to take the arguments for this
model of integration seriously on their own merits, and seeks to provide a serious and
sustained analysis and critique in response.
12 This discussion will be limited to the physical and life sciences. It does not
address social sciences.
[Vol. 43:15291534
20101 Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration
principles on the grounds that they are unintelligible in scientific
terms. Such principles include foundational concepts such as freedom,
equality, justice, and even "personhood" itself.
Part V offers a provisional way forward. Under the proposed
approach, integration is a function of defining and policing the
boundaries of scientific methods and ethical reasoning, according to
their respective competencies for the particular public bioethical
question at issue. This approach provides an analytic tool to facilitate
this line drawing, and illustrates its application with reference to three
contemporary debates within public bioethics: the recent FDA
approval of Plan B emergency contraception, the federal funding of
embryonic stem cell research, and the impact of cognitive
neuroscience on theories of criminal punishment.
I. WHAT IS PUBLIC BIOETHICS?
A. Public Bioethics: Marrying Moral Principles with State Action
Bioethics emerged in America as a field of scholarly inquiry during
the 1960s. 3 Extraordinary advances in biomedicine and biotechnology
had transformed the practice of medicine by extending life (though
often in diminished condition, raising ethical questions about
termination of treatment and end-of-life care); driving up costs
(leading to distributive justice issues); and creating an increased need
for human subjects for biomedical research (prompting ethical
questions about the relationship between the right to personal
autonomy and interests of the broader society in pursuing research
13 See GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, BODY, SOUL, AND BIOETHICS 1 (1995) ("Albert Jonsen
dates 'the birth of bioethics' from the year 1962, when Shana Alexander's article
describing the Seattle dialysis selection committee appeared in Life magazine.
Elsewhere Jonsen describes 1965-75 as the 'formative decade' for bioethics in this
country. David Rothman, in what is the first history of the bioethics movement, dates
its beginning with the 1966 publication of Henry Beecher's articles exposing abuses in
human experimentation."). The origin of the term "bioethics" is contested, though its
first usage appeared in 1970. It has been attributed both to Sargent Shriver (original
funder of the Georgetown Kennedy Institute of Ethics) and Van Renesslear Potter
(research oncologist from University of Wisconsin). Whereas Shriver used the term to
denote the ethical analysis of the development and application of biomedical science,
Potter seemingly meant something more capacious, encompassing the relationship
between man, his environment, and the civilized world (an "open ended biocybernetic
study of self-assessment toward evolutionary, physiological, and cultural adaptation").
Shriver's definition more closely approximates the meaning of the term as it is used in
America. For a discussion of the history of the term, see generally ALBERTJONSEN, THE
BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 27 (1998).
1535
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aimed at developing treatments for dread diseases and injuries). 14 The
revolution in molecular biology began in 1953 with the discovery of
the structure of DNA by James Watson and Francis Crick. 5 This
discovery prompted questions about human identity and man's new
capacities to understand and perhaps even modify it. 16 The invention
and development of in vitro fertilization - allowing human
conception and manipulation of the human embryo outside of the
body - similarly prompted vexing humanistic questions about the
meaning of procreation, the moral status of the embryo, and the ethics
of screening, selecting, discarding, or otherwise experimenting on
such embryos. 7 More recently, the development of techniques and
'4 SeeJONSEN, supra note 13, at 12.
J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171
NATURE 737,737 (1953).
11 Recombinant DNA technology was developed in 1973 by Stanley Cohen and
Herbert Boyer. See Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial
Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 3240, 3240 (1973). Later, this technology
was advanced by the discovery of restriction endonucleases by Werner Arber, Daniel
Nathans, and Hamilton Smith, which led to their winning the Nobel Prize for
Medicine in 1978. See The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1978,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/medicineAaureates/1978/ (last visited July 29,
2009). Techniques for artificially combining the genetic or cellular material of
different mammalian species (such as by fusing their respective embryos) to create
interspecies hybrids or chimeras have existed since the 1980s, and in 1997, two
American researchers filed a patent application for chimeras made from combinations
of humans and animals. Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal
Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 443 (1999). For a good overview of the science
behind these techniques, see generally id. at 445-47; Tara Seyfer, The Science of
Chimeras and Hybrids, 29 ETHICS & MEDICS 7 (2004).
17 See R.G. Edwards et al., Early Stages of Fertilization In Vitro of Human Oocytes
Matured In Vitro, 221 NATURE 632, 635 (1969); see also AH Handyside et al., Birth of a
Normal Girl After In Vitro Fertilization and Preimplantation Diagnostic Testing for Cystic
Fibrosis, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 905, 908 (1992) (describing successful
preimplantation diagnosis for genetic disorder that causes cystic fibrosis). For a
discussion of these issues see THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION
AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES Pt. I, chs. 3-5 (Mar.
2004) [hereinafter REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY]. Subsequent developments
raising similarly vexing ethical concerns include: the cloning of Dolly the sheep by
somatic cell nuclear transfer (by Ian Wilmut in 1996), the derivation of stem cells
from human embryos (by a team led by James Thomson in 1998), and the
"completed" sequencing of the genome for all human chromosomes (by the Human
Genome Project in 2006). See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines
Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998); lan Wilmut et al., Viable
Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 810 (1997); U.S.
Department of Energy Office of Science Human Genome Project Information Site,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/home.shtml (last visited July
30, 2008); see also S.G. Gregory et al., The DNA Sequence and Biological Annotation of
Human Chromosome, 441 NATURE 315 (2006) (detailing sequence of final chromosome
1536 [Vol. 43:1529
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practices to enhance human performance or extend lifespan "beyond
the normal" leads to questions about the meaning of human
flourishing and its relationship (if any) to human finitude.' 8 New
research on the relationship of brain, mind, and behavior, made
possible by recent advances in powerful (though non-invasive)
techniques for imaging the structure and function of the brain gives
rise to questions about free will, moral responsibility, and all of the
social institutions and principles that rest on these concepts. 9 The
continued development of medical interventions and techniques that
sustain basic biological functioning long after cognitive capacities have
irretrievably passed away raises profound questions about autonomy
and dignity at the end of life, our collective obligations to provide
humane care for the aged and dying, and even the definitions of "life"
and "death" themselves.20
This explosion of biomedical innovation reoriented the physician's
role towards technical and scientific mastery, emphasizing competence
above all else. This had salutary effects on patient outcomes, but raised
concerns about the doctor-patient relationship, and gave rise to much
disagreement about the proper ends of medicine.2' As Albert Jonsen
has noted, "the scientific training of which modern medicine was so
proud seemed to transform the healer into the technician who was
remote, difficult to see, and even more difficult to understand."22
in project).
16 See THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY 14 (2003), available
at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/.
19 See Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible
Legal and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE
LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114, 114 (Brent Garland ed., The Dana
Press 2004); Joshua D. Greene & Jonathan D. Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience
Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1775-76 (2004); Judy Illes & Stephanie J. Bird, Neuroethics: A
Modern Context for Ethics in Neuroscience, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 511, 515 (2006);
Stephen Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 1, 20-35 (2008); Robert
Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787, 1787-88 (2004); 0. Carter Snead,
Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265,
1290-93 (2007) [hereinafter Snead, Neuroimaging].
20 See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE (3d ed. 2004 &
Supp. 2008); THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, CONTROVERSIES IN THE
DETERMINATION OF DEATH (2008); THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING
CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING SOCIETY (2005).
21 See JONSEN, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that Harper's Supplement in 1960
featured an article on "The Crisis in American Medicine" describing such worries).
22 Id.
1537
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A series of conferences were convened to reflect on these tensions
between the humanistic and scientific dimensions of medical
practice.23 As Doctor S. Marsh Tenney (then Dean of the Dartmouth
Medical School) noted at one of the very first such events:
Although [medicine's] foundations have become more
rational, its practice - the welding of science and humanism
- is said to have become more remote and indifferent to
human values, and once again medicine has been forced to
remind itself that it is often the human factors that are
determinant.
24
Shortly thereafter, several centers were founded to explore
bioethical questions in a sustained and rigorous way.
2 5
At roughly the same time as these physicians, scientists, theologians,
legal scholars, and social scientists were considering such questions at
academic conferences and in newly founded centers, Congressmen on
Capitol Hill turned their attention to the public dimension of bioethics,
and took up the issue of governance in this domain. Senator Walter
Mondale convened hearings in 1968 in connection with his proposal
to create a "President's Commission on Health Science and Society."
This Commission would recommend policies on organ
transplantation, genetic engineering, behavior control, human subjects
protections, and the financing of research.26 Mondale's initial efforts
foundered, but in 1973 Senator Edward Kennedy convened hearings
to discuss proposed research on living fetuses slated for abortion, as
well as the discriminatory and abusive treatment of human subjects in
scientific research (such as those that had occurred in Tuskegee,
13 Id. at 13-14. Such conferences included the "Great Issues in Modern Medicine"
held at Dartmouth College in 1960; "Man and His Future," held by the Ciba
Foundation in London in 1962; and the Nobel Laureate Series at Gustavus Adolphus
College, which included "Genetics and the Future of Man" (held in 1965, featuring a
presentation by William Shockley on eugenics, and a rebuttal by Paul Ramsey) and
"The Human Mind" (in 1967, featuring a presentation by James Gustafson). Id.
24 Id. at 13.
25 See id. at 25-27. Such institutions included: the Hastings Center (founded in
1969 to study ethical issues relating to death and dying, behavioral control, genetic
engineering and counseling, and population control); the Society for Health and
Human Values (founded in 1969 in response to concerns about an undue emphasis on
mechanistic explanations in medical education); and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics
at Georgetown University (opened in 1971 to study issues in reproduction and
ethics). Id.
26 See id. at 90 (citing Hearings on SJ. Res. 145 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't
Research of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Walter Mondale)).
[Vol. 43:15291538
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Alabama).2" After much debate, these hearings culminated in the
passage of the National Research Act.' Among other things, this Act
created the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Commission was
charged "to identify basic ethical principles that should underlie the
conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving human
subjects and develop guidelines that should be followed in such
research," and to conduct a "comprehensive study of the ethical, legal,
and social implications of advances in biomedical research." The Act
directed the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare29  to
implement the National Commission's advice within a stated period of
time, or to show cause why such action was not taken.3 °
With the passage of this statutory mandate directing the National
Commission to "do bioethics" in an enforceable way, public bioethics
in America was born. Since then, public bioethics has been a
permanent and active feature of the work of the political branches of
government. At the federal level alone, the Executive and Legislative
branches have taken numerous actions in response to ethical issues
raised by advances in biomedical science and biotechnology.3'
Numerous federal commissions 32 on bioethics have been convened to
27 See V.N. Gamble, Under the Shadow of Tuskegee: African Americans and Health
Care, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1773 (1997) (discussing Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
forty year government study in which hundreds of black men were "deliberately
denied effective treatment for syphilis in order to document the natural history of the
disease").
28 National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
29 Today, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is known as the
Department of Health and Human Services. See U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Historical Highlights, http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2010).
30 For a detailed discussion of the Mondale and Kennedy hearings, see JONSEN,
supra note 13, at 92-100.
"' For an extended reflection on public bioethics at the federal level from 2001-
2009, see Snead, Public Bioethics, supra note 4.
32 See, e.g., Former Bioethics Commissions, http://bioethics.gov/reports/past-
commissions/index.html (last visited July 29, 2009). The National Commission for
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created in
1974, the President's Commission for Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created in 1978, the Ethics Advisory Board
was created in 1978, the Human Embryo Research Panel was created in 1994, the
Biomedical Ethical Advisory Committee was created in 1988, the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission was created in 1996, the President's Council on Bioethics was
created in 2001, the Advisory Commission on Human Radiation Experiments was
created in 1994, and the NIH-DOE Joint Working Group on Ethical, Legal and Social
Implications of Human Genome Research was formed in 1989. Id.
1539
University of California, Davis
offer advice.33 Administrative agencies such as the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), the National Institutes of Health
("NIH"), and even the Justice Department have propounded
regulations that touch and concern bioethical matters. Such issues
have included human subjects protections,34 the federal funding of
embryo and fetal research,35 gene therapy research,36 conscience
protections for health care providers, and physician assisted
suicide.38
Similarly, Congress has enacted several laws concerning abortion
and fetal personhood, 39 research involving embryos and fetuses,4°
conscience protections for health care providers, 1 the patenting of
human embryos,42  organ transplantation, 43  and end-of-life
33 For an extended reflection on public bioethics at the federal level from 2001-
2009, see generally 0. Carter Snead, The George W. Bush Administration: Public
Bioethics and the Bush Presidency, 32 HARv. L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 867 (2009).
31 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2008) (known as "The Common Rule").
35 National Institute of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed.
Reg. 32,170-02 (July 7, 2009). See generally MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra
note 6 (discussing ethical, legal, and scientific dimensions of this issue).
36 For a comprehensive discussion of the law, ethics, and science of this matter,
see REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 17.
7 See 45 C.F.R. § 88.1 (2009); Recission of the Regulation Entitled "Ensuring that
Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or
Discriminatory Polocies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law," 74 Fed. Reg.
10,207-01 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
38 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275-76 (2006) (invalidating
Attorney General's efforts to ban physician assisted suicide by administrative rule).
39 See, e.g., Born Alive Infant's Protection Act, 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2006); Unborn
Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (Laci and Conner's Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1841, 10 U.S.C.
§ 919a (2006) (recognizing child in utero as legal victim if he or she is injured during
commission of crime); Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531
(2006) (banning form of late term abortion); Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439 §
209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976) (restricting federal funding of abortion).
4 See, e.g., Fetus Farming Prohibition Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-242, § 2, 120
Stat. 570, 570-71 (2006) (criminalizing acceptance of human tissue when pregnancy
was deliberately started to provide such tissue or if human embryo was gestated in
nonhuman animal); Dickey Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34
(1996) (prohibiting Department of Health and Human Services from using
appropriated funds for creation of human embryos for research purposes or for
research in which human embryos are destroyed).
41 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, §
508(d)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004) (forbidding use of federal funds to
programs that subject any health care entity to discrimination on basis that that entity
does not provide for abortions).
42 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634,
118 Stat. 3, 101 (2004) (forbidding use of federal funds to programs that issue patents
on claims directed to or encompassing a human organism).
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decisionmaking. 4 Congress has debated (though not enacted) many
more bills in this domain, relating to issues such as abortion,45 human
cloning,4 and funding for non-embryonic sources of pluripotent cells
(stem cells).47
Even the federal judiciary has contributed to the development of
public bioethics. The U.S. Supreme Court has reserved the bulk of the
abortion question to itself in the seminal case of Roe v. Wade and its
progeny.48 It has also issued opinions in landmark cases relating to
end of life decisionmaking, 4 physician assisted suicide,"° and the
patenting of living organisms.51
Governors, state legislatures, and state courts have been similarly
active in public bioethics. Given their nearly plenary authority to act
13 See, e.g., National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339
(1984) (outlawing sale of human organs).
I See, e.g., An Act for the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15 (2005) (authorizing suit by parents of Theresa Schaivo that could provide
injunctive relief for vindication of her rights relating to medical treatment necessary to
sustain her life); Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4571,
104 Stat. 1388-115, 1388-204 (1990) (requiring health care providers to provide
written information to adults regarding their rights under state law to make decisions
regarding medical care and right to formulate advance directives).
45 See, e.g., Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, H.R. 1063, 110th Cong.
(2007) (preventing transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating
to abortion).
I See, e.g., Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007, S. 1036, 110th Cong. (2007)
(proposing to prohibit human cloning); A Bill to Prohibit Human Cloning and Protect
Stem Cell Research, S. 812, 110th Cong. (2007) (same).
47 See, e.g., The HOPE Act, S. 30, 110th Cong. (2007) (promoting stem cell
research from non-embryonic sources, such as amniotic fluid).
48 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down
Nebraska law and invalidating all state laws criminalizing partial birth abortion);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (purporting to reaffirm
core holding of Roe v. Wade but changing constitutional status of right to abortion
from fundamental right to protected liberty interest and abandoning Roe's trimester
framework in favor of pre- versus post-viability dichotomy of regulation; before fetal
viability, state may not "unduly burden" woman's right to choose abortion, whereas
post-viability, state may restrict abortion provided it includes exceptions for the
woman's life and "health" as defined in Doe v. Bolton); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (holding that "health" includes physical, emotional, psychological, and familial
factors, as determined by abortion provider); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(declaring abortion to be fundamental right, and purporting to provide framework
establishing contours of state regulation of abortion).
I See Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990).
o See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807-08 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
51 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
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in the name of the health, safety, welfare, and morals of citizens, it
should not be surprising that the states have been fertile soil for this
type of governance. 52 To take only a few examples, states have been
involved in the regulation of abortion (to the extent permitted by
Supreme Court precedent)," the use of assisted reproductive
technologies,54 embryo research,55 human cloning,56 research involving
human subjects, physician assisted suicide,5  end-of-life
decisionmaking, 59 and the definition of death.'
52 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) ("In reviewing state
legislation, whether considered to be in the exercise of the State's police powers, or in
provision for the health, safety, morals or welfare of its people, it is clear that what is
concerned are 'the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.' Only to the
extent that the Constitution so requires may this Court interfere with the exercise of
this plenary power of government." (citation omitted)).
53 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114 (West 2009) (Parental Notice of Abortion Act)
(requiring parental notification for women under age of 18 prior to abortion); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (2009) (requiring informed consent of woman); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.1-01 (2008) (North Dakota Abortion Control Act) (requiring "informed
consent" and mandatory waiting period).
54 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325 (West 2010) (governing
procedures for solicitation and donation of oocytes for assisted reproductive
technology); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 2009) (creating presumption that any
child conceived by artificial insemination is child of husband and wife); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. 9:126 (2009) (stating that any fertilized human ovum is not property of
physicians or donors); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2009) (regarding legal status of
children of assisted conception); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.700-26.26.740
(West 2009) (defining rights of donors and children created through assisted
reproduction under Uniform Parentage Act).
5 See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2009) (restricting
nontherapeutic research on live human embryos, fetuses, or neonates); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2Z-2 (West 2009) (stating that it is policy of state to permit research on human
embryonic stem cells); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (West 2009) (criminalizing
experimentation on unborn child).
56 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1002 (West 2009) (making human cloning
Class C Felony); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (2006) (prohibiting human
cloning to produce children); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.16274, 333.16275,
750.430a (West 2009) (prohibiting human cloning); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-2
(prescribing administrative and civil penalties to those who engage in "human
cloning," as defined by statute); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-39-02 (2008) (making
human cloning Class C Felony); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (2008) (prohibiting
somatic cell nuclear transfer); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-162.21, 32.1-162.22 (West
2009) (imposing civil penalties to those who engage in cloning).
"' See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (holding
that parent cannot consent to participation of child or other person under legal
disability in nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or
damage to health of subject).
58 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.309 (West 2009) (pointing out that nothing in
code should construe to authorize "mercy killing or euthanasia"); N.Y. PENAL LAW
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Public bioethics is distinctive as a species of governance because it
merges state action with strong and contested moral claims. The
currency of public bioethical discourse includes concepts such as
autonomy, justice, equality, dignity, and personhood. These and other
similar ethical principles are indispensable to the political
deliberations in this domain. An extended reflection on a most vexed
public bioethical issue - federal funding for embryonic stem cell
research - confirms that this is so.
61
B. A Modern Illustration of Public Bioethics: Federal Funding of Stem
Cell Research
The moral, legal, and public policy dispute over embryonic stem cell
research (and related matters, such as human cloning) is the most
prominent issue in public bioethics of the past decade. Since the
derivation of human embryonic stem cells in 1998 at the University of
Wisconsin,62 the issue has been debated and discussed by scholars,
politicians, members of the popular media, and the public at large. It
has been a key element of political campaigns, as well as of the
§ 120.30 (McKinney 2009) (making promotion of suicide attempt felony); Oregon
Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800-127.897 (West 2009)
(allowing terminally-ill people to end their lives through voluntary self-administration
of lethal medications, expressly prescribed by physician for that purpose);
Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010-
70.245.904 (West 2009) (allowing terminally ill adults seeking to end their life to
request lethal doses of medication from physicians).
" See, e.g., 2003 Fla. Laws 418 (giving governor authority to issue stay to prevent
withholding of nutrition and hydration from patient under circumstances like that of
Theresa Marie Schaivo); Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (overturning stay
issued by legislature to prevent continued withholding of nutrition and hydration
from Theresa Marie Schaivo); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (setting forth
guidelines with respect to life sustaining treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976) (holding that decision by daughter to permit noncognitive, vegetative existence
to terminate by natural forces was valuable incident of her right to privacy which
could be asserted on her behalf by her guardian); Florida Governor's Office, Exec.
Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003) (staying continued withholding of nutrition and
hydration from Theresa Schaivo).
I See, e.g., Uniform Determination of Death Act, 12 U.L.A. 271 (1985); Uniform
Law Commissioners, Uniform Determination of Death Act, July 21, 2004,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-udda.asp (noting
forty-three states have adopted Uniform Determination of Death Act, or substantially
similar legislation).
61 The extended reflection that follows is also a necessary precursor for the
discussion, in Part V.B.2, of my proposed model of integration for the public
bioethical issue of embryonic stem cell research.
2 See Thomson et al., supra note 17, at 1145.
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activities of the political branches of government at the state and
federal level.
The primary question raised by the practice of embryonic stem cell
research is whether it is morally defensible to disaggregate (and thus
destroy) living human embryos in order to derive pluripotent cells
(stem cells) for purposes of basic research that may someday yield
regenerative therapies.63 The public question at issue over the past
decade is whether and to what extent to fund such research with
taxpayer dollars. This issue raises additional contested normative
questions about moral complicity, respect for conscience in a
pluralistic society, the moral and political significance of government
endorsement (e.g., through federal funding), and the obligations of
citizenship.
The embryos used in this kind of research are typically donated by
individuals or couples who conceived them by in vitro fertilization
("IVF") in the context of receiving assisted reproduction treatment,
but who no longer need or want them for such a purpose. There are
reports of some researchers creating embryos by IVF solely for use
(and destruction) in research.' Theoretically, embryos for use in stem
cell research could also be created by somatic cell nuclear transfer
(that is, human cloning for biomedical research, or so-called
"therapeutic cloning"), though efforts to derive pluripotent cells from
cloned human embryos have not yet succeeded.65
The scientific aspirations for embryonic stem cell research are
manifold, including the goals of understanding the mechanisms of
63 Pluripotent cells are unique and valuable because they are undifferentiated
(meaning that they have the capacity to become any kind of tissue in the body) and, in
principle, self-renewing (that is, they can reproduce themselves indefinitely without
losing their pluripotency). They can be derived from the inner-cell mass of the early
embryo (embryonic stem cells), the gonadal ridge of the early fetus (embryonic germ
cells), and perhaps from a variety of other sources, including amniotic fluid, bone
marrow, adipose cells, etc. Recent developments suggest that adult cells can be
reprogrammed to pluripotency through the introduction of certain genetic factors.
See, e.g., Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult
Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861 (2007) (demonstrating generation
of induced pluripotent human dermal fibroblasts with four transcription factors).
' See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Scientists Create Scores of Embryos to Harvest Cells, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2001, at Al.
65 For extended discussion of the science, ethics, and public policy of embryonic
stem cell research and human cloning, see MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra
note 6; HUMAN CLONING, supra note 8; see also 0. Carter Snead, The Pedagogical
Significance of the Bush Stem Cell Policy, 5 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 491, 496-
503 (2005); 0. Carter Snead, Preparing the Groundwork for a Responsible Debate on
Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning, 39 NEw ENG. L. REv. 479, 481-87 (2005)
(keynote address for symposium).
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early human development, to test and develop pharmaceuticals, and
ultimately, to devise new regenerative therapies. According to
prominent researchers in this field, realizing these aspirations will
require the creation of a bank of embryonic stem cell lines large
enough to be sufficiently diverse both for the creation of models to
study all relevant diseases or injuries that might admit of regenerative
cell-based therapy, and for purposes of immunocompatibility (i.e., to
avoid tissue rejection by transplant recipients) should such therapies
be developed.6" This program will thus require the use and destruction
of millions of human embryos. Given the scarcity of donated IVF
embryos for this purpose,67 creating embryos solely for the sake of
research (by IVF or cloning) seems to be a necessity for realizing the
aspirations of advocates of embryonic stem cell research."
American Presidents, through their directives to the NIH
(responsible for a large portion of federal research funding), have
taken divergent normative views on this question. For present
purposes it is worth examining how such ethical judgments have
driven the policies of recent administrations.
For the past thirty years the political branches have been locked in a
stalemate on the issue. The National Commission recommended that
Congress charter a permanent body known as the Ethics Advisory
Board ("EAB") to review and approve any federally funded research
involving in vitro embryos. Thereafter, this requirement was adopted as
a federal regulation.69 While the EAB issued a report in 1979 approving,
as an abstract ethical matter, the funding of research involving the use
and destruction of in vitro embryos, its charter expired before it had the
opportunity to review and approve any concrete proposals. Its
membership was never reconstituted, but the legal requirement for EAB
approval remained in place. Thus a de facto moratorium on the funding
of embryo research was sustained until 1993, when Congress (at the
urging of the newly elected President Clinton) removed the EAB
approval requirement from the law.7"
66 See Robert Lanza & Nadia Rosenthal, The Stem Cell Challenge, Sci. AM. 92
(2004).
67 The most comprehensive study, conducted by RAND in 2003, estimated that as
of that date, there were 400,000 or so embryos in cryopreservation, only 2.8 percent of
which have been formally designated for donation. See David I. Hoffman et al.,
Cryptopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their Availability for Research, 79
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1068 (2003).
8 See Lanza & Rosenthal, supra note 66, at 92.
6' Additional Protections for Pregnant Women, Human Fetuses and Neonates
Involved in Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1982) (nullified 2003).
70 See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43,
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President Clinton thereafter directed the NIH to formulate
recommendations governing the federal funding of embryo research.
The NIH Human Embryo Panel convened and issued a report in 1994
recommending federal funding for research involving the use and
destruction of in vitro embryos - including research protocols in
which embryos were created solely for this purpose (subject to certain
limitations).71  President Clinton accepted most of these
recommendations (though he rejected the panel's approval for funding
projects using embryos created solely for the sake of research),72 and
made preparations to authorize such funding. Before he could act,
however, control of Congress shifted from democrat to republican,
and the new majority attached an appropriations rider to the 1996
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The amendment forbade the
federal funding of:
[Tihe creation of a human embryo or embryos for research
purposes; or [for] research in which a human embryo or
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to
risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research
on fetuses in utero [under the relevant human subjects
protection regulations] ."
This amendment (known as the "Dickey Amendment," after its chief
sponsor), which has been reauthorized every year since, appeared to
short-circuit the Clinton administration's efforts to fund embryo
research. That is, until 1998, in the wake of the derivation of human
embryonic stem cells,74 the General Counsel of President Clinton's
Department of Health and Human Services issued an opinion
declaring that the Dickey Amendment permitted the funding of
research involving stem cells that had been derived from the
disaggregation (and thus destruction) of human embryos, so long as
the researchers did not use federal funds to destroy the embryos in the
first instance. In other words, so long as researchers used private
resources to destroy the embryos in question, subsequent research
§ 121(c), 107 Stat. 122, 133 (1993) (repealing 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d)).
71 See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL 44-
45 (Sept. 1994).
72 President Clinton's position was supported by the Washington Post editorial
board as well. See Editorial, Embryos: Drawing the Line, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at C6.
73 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26,
34 (1996).
7' Thomson et al., supra note 17, at 1145.
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involving the resultant cellular products derived from the embryo-
destructive act was not, literally, research "in which" embryos are
destroyed, as contemplated by the Dickey Amendment.75
Before any funds could be authorized under this new interpretation,
President George W. Bush was elected, and as is typical of newly
elected presidents, he ordered suspension of all pending
administrative agency initiatives for review (including those relating to
funding embryo research). In resolving the moral and political
question presented, President Bush appealed to both a robust
conception of human equality and the findings of modern embryology.
The relevant science confirmed that the five-to-six day old human
embryo used and destroyed in stem cell research is a complete, living,
self-directing, integrated, whole individual. 76 An embryo is a member
15 Memorandum from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel of the Department of
Health and Human Services, to Harold Varmus, Director of the National Institutes of
Health, Federal Funding for Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells (Jan.
15, 1999) (on file with National Archives).
76 President Bush implicitly rejected the argument that because the embryos used
in stem cell research may be capable of "twinning," they are not yet stable individuals,
and thus not entitled to substantial moral respect. Twinning is the process by which
cells that become disarticulated from the embryo sometimes, through a process of
restitution and regulation, resolve themselves into a new, whole organism. It is
believed that twinning occurs in very few cases - monozygotic twins are rare,
accounting for only 1 in 240 births. President Bush may have been moved by the
argument that, as a biological matter, "indivisibility" is not regarded as a necessary
criterion for individuation in an organism. Other species are clearly classified as
individual organisms, despite their capacity for the biological equivalent of twinning
(for example, flatworms). Rather, organisms are defined according to the level of
integration and organization of their constituent parts. Human embryos show highly
integrated organization, specialization, and differentiation well before the blastocyst
phase of development (that is, when they are used in stem cell research). Accordingly,
there is strong support for the proposition that a blastocyst is clearly an individuated
organism, that is, a whole, individual member of the human species. See George W.
Bush, Stem Cell Science and the Preservation of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, at
WK13; see, e.g., Louis Guenin, The Nonindividuation Argument Against Zygotic
Personhood, 81 PHILOSOPHY 463, 485 (2006) (arguing in favor of embryo research on
other grounds). Moreover, opponents of the twinning argument cite recent research
(showing a dramatic increase in incidence of monzygotic twinning after blastocyst
transfer) to support the notion that monozygotic twinning is caused by an extrinsic
disruption (for example, blastomere biopsy, as performed in preimplantation genetic
diagnosis), and is not an intrinsic quality of the early embryo. See, e.g., MONITORING
STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 80 ("Evidence for this, they suggest, may be seen
in the increased incidence of monozygotic twinning (up to tenfold in blastocyst
transfer) associated with IVF. This suggests, in their view, that twinning is neither a
proof of the absence of an integrated individual organism with a drive in the direction
of development nor a demonstration ex post facto of the absence of moral worth of the
embryo before twinning."); HUMAN CLONING, supra note 8, at 271 (personal statement
of Doctor William B. Hurlbut) ("Monozygotic twinning (a mere 0.4 % of births) does
1547
University of California, Davis
of the human species, who, given the proper environment will (if all
goes well) move itself along the trajectory of human biological
development from embryo, to fetus, to neonate, to child, to
adolescent, to adult.77 The biological status of embryos as human
organisms did not, however, settle the question of their moral status.
For this judgment, President Bush invoked human equality as a
principle of classical liberalism underlying the nation's founding. In
his judgment, the only coherent (non self-destroying) understanding
of human equality is one that encompasses all human beings without
discrimination on the basis of accidental characteristics such as age,
size, condition of dependency or vulnerability, circumstances, or the
esteem of others. Accordingly, President Bush concluded that the
intentional use and destruction of embryos in stem cell research is
gravely immoral and unjust. Furthermore, he took the position that
the intentional creation of embryos (by IVF or cloning) for use and
destruction in research is, afortiori, morally unacceptable.7"
not appear to be either an intrinsic drive or a random process within embryogenesis.
Rather, it is a disruption of normal development by a mechanical or biochemical
disturbance of fragile cell relationships that provokes a compensatory repair, but with
the restitution of integrity within two distinct trajectories of embryological
development."). For evidence that embryos are integrated at the earliest stages of
development, see id. at 263-64 (personal statement of Professors George and Gomez-
Lobo) (explaining, with extensive reference to findings of modern embryology,
manifold ways in which embryo, from its earliest stages of development is unitary,
integrated, differentiated, self-directing organism).
77 It is a basic premise of modem embryology that the zygote (one-cell embryo) is
an organism and is totipotent (that is, moves itself along the developmental trajectory
through the various developmental stages). For a general overview of the
developmental trajectory of zygotes, see MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note
6, at Appendix A, Notes on Early Human Development.
78 President Bush has also expressed several other ethical concerns about human
cloning for biomedical research, including the following worries: that its practice
makes reproductive cloning inevitable (as the only remaining step for that procedure
is transfer of the cloned embryo to a woman's uterus); it represents an unprecedented
step towards more refined techniques of engineering human organisms with a pre-
selected genetic constitution; and the massive number of ova required to conduct
cloning research creates dangerous incentives to exploit women, particularly poor
women as sources. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 117 (Jan. 28, 2008) (calling on
Congress to "pass legislation that bans unethical practices, such as the buying, selling,
patenting, or cloning of human life"); Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress
on the State of the Union, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 145 (Jan. 31, 2006) (asking
Congress to prohibit human cloning in all its forms); Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on the State of the Union, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 126 (Feb. 2,
2005) (calling for scientific advances to always serve human dignity rather than taking
advantage of some lives for benefit of others).
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In making this judgment, President Bush implicitly rejected the
notion that an individual's moral status (and the attendant protections
that it entails) waxes and wanes according to the judgment of others,
in light of physical, mental, or circumstantial criteria that such others
might establish.79 He argued that this competing approach stands the
equality principle on its head - privileging the claims of the strong
over those of the weak. In such a regime, the rights (including the
basic right to life) of the weak are determined entirely according to the
needs and desires of the strong. Nothing, he concluded, could be more
anathema to the American principle of intrinsic, inalienable rights.
Moreover, he believed that this principle of contingent personhood
would produce monstrous practical results (including, for example, a
sliding scale of moral and legal standing for people based on their
cognitive ability, usefulness, strength, and so on). By extension, he
rejected the arguments of those who assert that the human embryo is
not entitled to a high degree of moral respect because it lacks certain
preferred (actively exercisable) capacities or characteristics.80 This, in
President Bush's mind, was tantamount to the most unjust and
invidious kind of discrimination. He likewise rejected the more
79 President Bush's conception of human equality stands in stark contrast to those
frameworks that define "persons" (that is, rights-bearing individuals who merit moral
concern and forbearance) in a more exclusive fashion - according to more exacting
criteria such as the presence or absence of certain active capacities (such as sentience,
the ability to feel pain, and so on). This competing approach is reflected in H.
Tristram Englehardt's argument that persons are those who have the ability to be
"concerned about moral arguments and... convinced by them. They must be self-
conscious, rational, free to choose, and must possess moral concern." MEILAENDER,
supra note 13, at 109-10 (quoting H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF
BIOETHICS (1986)). In a similar vein, bioethicist Ronald Green has argued that the
criteria for personhood needs to be determined by those who are indisputably persons
(that is, members of the able-minded community of reasoners), according to their
judgments about how granting or withholding moral personhood might affect the
liberty interests of the decisionmakers. See Ronald Green, Toward a Copernican
Revolution in Our Thinking About Life's Beginning and Life's End, 66 SOUNDINGS 152,
152-57 (1983). Under these and related approaches, "personhood" or moral worth is
something that is earned or accrued. It is not an intrinsic quality, co-extensive with
merely being a living human being.
80 A prominent proposed characteristic for this purpose is the "primitive streak"
- a biological structure that marks the location of the vertebral column and indicates
the anterior-posterior axis of the organism (though recent evidence suggests that
polarity may be established much earlier, perhaps by the locus of penetration of the
egg by the sperm). The primitive streak also marks the moment after which twinning
is no longer possible. Other suggested capacities marking personhood include the
nervous system, the brain, and more mature human somatic form. For a review of
these arguments and rejoinders to them, see MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra
note 6.
1549
University of California, Davis
limited argument in favor of using and destroying donated embryos
from fertility clinics because they are destined to be discarded and
destroyed in any event. President Bush's understanding of equality
dictated that living human beings should not be treated as raw
materials to be exploited and destroyed for biomedical research
purposes simply because someone else has made the decision that
their lives were no longer useful and thus should be terminated.8" And
his devotion to the principle of radical equality and, in his words,
respect for the "matchless worth" of every individual, led him to reject
a straightforward utilitarian argument that assumed the personhood of
the embryo, but nevertheless justified its use in research simply by
virtue of the hoped-for lifesaving promise of the therapies that might
emerge from it.82
As a legal matter, President Bush agreed with his predecessor that
the Dickey Amendment, read literally, did not preclude funding for
research where embryos had been destroyed using private resources.
But he adopted a policy, announced on August 9, 2001, whereby
federal funding would only flow to those species of stem cell research
that did not create future incentives for destruction of human life in
the embryonic stage of development. Concretely, this entailed funding
for nonembryonic stem cell research (for example, stem cells derived
from differentiated tissue - so-called "adult" stem cell research), and
research on embryonic stem cell lines that had been derived before the
announcement of the policy (i.e., where the embryos had already been
destroyed) .83
When he announced the policy, he said that there were more than
sixty genetically diverse lines that met the funding criteria.' In the
days that followed, more such lines were identified, bringing the
number to seventy-eight. Though seventy-eight lines were eligible for
funding, only twenty-one lines were available for research, for reasons
relating both to scientific and intellectual property related issues.8" As
"I For an extended exploration of this argument, see Gilbert Meilaender, Spare
Embryos, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug.-Sept. 2002, at 25.
82 See, e.g., Julian Savulescu, The Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery and the
Cannibalization of Human Beings, 16 BIOETHIcS 508, 529 (2002) ("ES cell technology
stands to benefit everyone .... It is this property that may make it reasonable to kill
some embryos to conduct ES cell research even if the embryo is a person.").
83 For general information regarding Bush stem cell policy, see The Bush Record: Fact
Sheet: Advancing Stem Cell Research in Ethical, Responsible Ways, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/factsheets/stemcells.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2010).
84 Bush, supra note 76, at WK13.
85 The President's Council on Bioethics explained the process by which an eligible
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of July 2007, the administration had made more than $3.7 billion
available for all eligible forms of research, including more than 170
million dollars for embryonic stem cell research. s6 By that time, nearly
one thousand shipments of cell preparations from these lines had been
shipped to researchers.87
Later in his administration, partly in response to the development of
a revolutionary technique to produce pluripotent cells by
reprogramming (or de-differentiating) adult cells (i.e., "induced
pluripotent state cells" or iPS cells), without need for embryos or ova,
President Bush directed the NIH to broaden the focus of its funding
efforts to include any and all promising avenues of pluripotent cell
research, regardless of origin.8 In this way, President Bush's policy
was designed to promote biomedical research to the maximal extent
possible, consistent with his robust principle of equality regarding
human embryos.89
Congress tried twice to override President Bush's stem cell funding
policy and authorize federal taxpayer support of embryonic stem cell
research by statute. President Bush vetoed both bills. Relatedly, a bill
was introduced to formally authorize support for research on
cell line becomes available for use:
The process of establishing a human embryonic stem cell line, turning the
originally extracted cells into stable cultured populations suitable for
distribution to researchers, involves an often lengthy process of growth,
characterization, quality control and assurance, development, and
distribution. In addition, the process of making lines available to federally
funded researchers involves negotiating a contractual agreement (a
"materials transfer agreement") with the companies or institutions owning
the cell lines, establishing guidelines for payment, intellectual property
rights over resulting techniques or treatments, and other essential legal
assurances between the provider and the recipient.
MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 43.
See generally Expanding Approved Stem Cell lines in Ethically Responsible Ways,
Exec. Order No. 13435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34591 (June 20, 2007); Message to the Senate
Returning Without Approval the "Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007," 43
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 833 (une 20, 2007). For funding figures, see The Bush Record,
Advancing Stem Cell Research in Ethical, Responsible Ways, httpI/georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/factsheets/stemcells.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2010).
7 The recently announced Phase I clinical trials for embryonic stem cell-based
therapies sponsored by Geron use Bush-approved cell lines. See Susan Jeffrey, First
Embryonic Stem Cell Based Therapy Trial in Spinal Cord Injury Gets FDA Nod, Jan. 27,
2009, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/58741 1.
See Expanding Approved Stem Cell Lines in Ethically Responsible Ways, 72
Fed. Reg. at 34,591.
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alternative (i.e., non-embryonic) sources of pluripotent cells.9" It
passed in the Senate with seventy votes, but was killed procedurally in
the House of Representatives. 9'
Apart from the White House and NIH, official bodies within the
Executive branch promoted the administration's policy regarding stem
cell research funding. The President's Council on Bioethics produced a
report exploring the arguments for and against the policy (as well as
three reports on related issues, including cloning, assisted
reproductive technologies, and alternative sources of pluripotent
cells).92 The FDA issued guidance documents and sent letters to
interested parties, including government officials, giving assurances
that the agency foresaw no difficulties and was well prepared to
administer the approval process of any therapeutic products that
might emerge from research using the approved embryonic stem cell
lines.9 3
On March 9, 2009, President Obama rescinded all of President
Bush's previous executive actions regarding funding for stem cell
research, and affirmatively directed the NIH to fund all embryonic
stem cell research that was "responsible, scientifically worthy ... to
the extent permitted by law."94 He gave the NIH 120 days to provide
more concrete guidelines.95 In July of that year, the NIH adopted a
policy of federal funding for research involving cell lines derived from
embryos originally conceived by IVF patients for reproductive
purposes but now no longer wanted for such purposes. The NIH
guidelines restrict funding to these kinds of cell lines on the grounds
90 The Hope Offered through Principled and Ethical Stem Cell Research Act (the
HOPE Act), S. 30, 110th Cong. (2007).
91 The Act was received in the House of Representatives on April 16, 2007, but
never left the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. See Snead, supra note 4, at
886-87.
92 See HuMAN CLONING, supra note 8; MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 6;
REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 17; PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS:
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF PLURIPOTENT CELS: A WHITE PAPER 1-62 (2005), available at
http'/bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbetreports/white.paper/.
93 See, e.g., Letter from Bernard A. Schwetz, Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner of Food and Drug Administration, to Senator Edward Kennedy (Sept.
5, 2001) (concluding that "[tihus, as intended and practiced, the FDA regulation of
xenotransplantation products, while aimed first and foremost at safeguarding the
public health, should not impose a substantial impediment to xenotransplantation
product development, including HEPSC that are produced by culture in vitro with
mouse cells").
4 Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem
Cells, Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667, 10,677 (Mar. 9, 2009).
95 Id.
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that there is, as yet, no social consensus on the morality of creating
embryos solely for the sake of research (either by IVF or somatic cell
nuclear transfer, also known as human cloning).96 Additionally, the
NIH guidelines forbid federal funding of research in which human
embryonic stem cells are combined with non-human primate
blastocysts, and research protocols in which human embryonic stem
cells might contribute to the germline of non-human animals.97 The
final version of the NIH guidelines explicitly articulate the animating
principles for the policy: belief in the potential of the research to
reveal knowledge about human development and perhaps regenerative
therapies, and the embryo donor's right to informed consent.98 Neither
President Obama nor the NIH guidelines have discussed the moral
status of the human embryo.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the extraordinary extent to
which rich ethical concepts such as personhood, equality, justice,
beneficence, and autonomy, drive the law concerning embryonic stem
cell research. This illustration fairly represents the larger field of
public bioethics more generally. Few species of governance blend law
and morality to the same extent. This feature of public bioethics will
prove crucial to the question of how science should and can be
integrated into the governing process and the law that it produces.
And this example of the public question of funding for embryonic
stem cell research will prove crucial to the below discussion of the
problem of (and perhaps the beginnings of a solution to) integration
of science into this domain.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION FOR SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
BIOETHICS: ONE PROMINENT PROPOSAL EXPLORED
A. The "Maximal Deference" Model
From the foregoing it is clear that public bioethics offers a unique
synthesis of scientific evidence, ethical principles, and prudential
judgments about governance. How, then, should these disparate
elements be integrated? Over the past decade - principally in the
context of the debate over federal funding for embryonic stem cell
research - one model of integration for science and public bioethics
has garnered substantial traction among a wide array of very
96 See National Institute of Health on Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg.
32170-02 (July 7, 2009).
97 Id.
98 Id.
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influential public figures. Simply stated, the proposal is that the
adjudication of vexing public bioethical questions should be
delegated99 to scientific experts who are to apply the neutral and
objective tools of their respective disciplines. Moreover, proponents of
this model of integration condemn public bioethical decisionmaking
based on personal judgments about moral goods to be pursued or
harms to be avoided as the illegitimate "politicization" of "scientific"
matters. Thus, the proposal contemplates strong, seemingly
categorical deference to experts solely deploying the premises and
methods of science. Accordingly, this approach to integration will be
termed the "Maximal Deference" model.
An impressive assembly of public figures has come forward to
defend Maximal Deference as a model of integration. Chief among
them is Professor Irving Weissman, Director of Stanford University's
Institute for Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine. Doctor
Weissman is an esteemed researcher. He is the recipient of numerous
awards, including the Linus Pauling Medal for Outstanding
Contributions to Science (given by Stanford University) and the Jessie
Stevenson Kovalenko Medal (given by the National Academy of
Sciences Council).' 0 He has been also been a high profile participant
in the public square - arguing forcefully in favor of federal and state
funding for embryonic stem cell research (including the adjunct
technique of cloning for biomedical research). In 2004 he was one of
the leading proponents of Proposition 71, a successful state
referendum that created a right (under the California constitution) to
engage in embryonic stem cell research, and developed a mechanism
for state funding of such research to the tune of $3.7 billion.
Weissman even appeared in campaign ads supporting the
referendum. 10
Weissman has been an outspoken proponent of the Maximal
Deference model of integration. In fact, he advised President Obama to
adopt this approach to federal funding of embryonic stem cell
research:
I reported ... to the Obama transition team, June 2nd .... If
you decide to lift the ban ... don't replace one ideology with
another, you should only go on the basis of what is
Here, "delegation" refers both to formal delegation of authority by legal means,
or informal delegation, in the form of categorical deference to the opinion of experts.
"0 Community Academic Profile of Irving L. Weissman, M.D., httpI/med.stanford.edul
profiles/stemcell/researcher/IrvingWeissman/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
101 Michael Fumento, The Great Stem-Cell-Research Scam, N.Y. POST, July 15, 2009,
http://www.fumento.com/biotech/greatstemcell.html.
1554 [Vol. 43:1529
20101 Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration
scientifically possible .... And Obama in his speech, and I was
there, said just that. He said we're going to remove politics and
ideology from scientific decision making.'02
Weissman expressed strong disagreement and even disgust with the
NIH guidelines implementing President Obama's executive order. The
guidelines limited funding eligibility to embryonic stem cell lines
derived from donated IVF embryos originally conceived for
reproductive purposes and prohibited funding for research involving
cell lines derived from embryos created solely for the sake of research
(by lVF or somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e., human cloning)).
Weissman lamented that the NIH based its guidelines in part on
ethical considerations rather than entirely on the projected capacities
of scientific researchers. He construed President Obama's executive
order as including no such limits.0 3 Weissman thought that the NIH
guidelines departed from the strictly science-driven rationale of the
executive order that they were meant to elaborate. 1°'
Weissman is not alone in his support for the Maximal Deference
model of integration. The starkest statement in this vein by a public
official was made by then-Congressman, now Ohio Governor Ted
102 Julia Brownell, Director Chides NIH Policy, STANFORD DAILY, Apr. 24, 2009, at 3
(emphasis added).
103 To be fair to Weissman, President Obama's executive order explicitly noted the
"broad agreement in the scientific community that the research should be supported
by Federal funds," and appeared on its face to authorize funding for all species of
embryonic stem cell research (including projects involving cell lines derived from
embryos created solely for the sake of research by IVF or human cloning). The only
restriction imposed by the executive order was that the research be "conduct[ed]
responsibl[yl," "scientifically worthy," and "permitted by law." Exec. Order No.
13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 §§ 1, 2 (Mar. 9, 2009). Accordingly, Weissman is correct
that President Obama's executive order is far broader and more permissive than the
NIH guidelines that implement it.
1' See Brownell, supra note 102, at 3 (" 'I was very surprised that when the NIH
interpreted [President Obama's] speech to write guidelines, they said they would only
fund research on embryonic stem cells derived from IVF clinic embryos, or
blastocysts,' Weissman said."). On March 29, 2009, President Obama confirmed that
he regarded ethical considerations as legitimate side constraints on scientific research,
though he did not elaborate how this might work:
QUESTION (from John Ward, Washington Times): [D]o you think that
scientific consensus is enough to tell us what we can and cannot do?
OBAMA: No. I think there's - there's always an ethical and a moral element
that has to be - be a part of this.
President Barack Obama, Press Conference (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http'//
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032403036.html.
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Strickland (also in the context of the embryonic stem cell debate):
"We should be guided strictly by the best available science, and we
should not allow theology, philosophy, or politics to interfere with the
decision we make on this issue." 11
5
Support for the Maximal Deference model can also be inferred from
the condemnation of reliance on ethical principles as impermissibly
importing politics into scientific decisionmaking. In reacting to
President Bush's funding policy, certain critics did not take issue with
the ethical principle animating it, namely, respect for equality of each
member of the human species, irrespective of her age, size, location,
race, sex, usefulness (or burdensomeness) to others, possession or
lack of certain favored physical or mental capacities, or the worth
assigned to her by others. Instead, they seemed to argue that any
moral constraint on embryonic stem cell research constituted the
impermissible politicization of science. Nobel Laureate Harold
Varmus, who serves as co-chair of President Obama's Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology ("PCAST"), wrote in an op-ed
entitled The Enlightenment Returns, that President Bush's funding
policy was an example of "dogma [taking] precedence over evidence,
and opinion over facts."1°6 In a press conference, Varmus recapitulated
this criticism, promising that the new administration would "use
sound, scientific practice and evidence, instead of dogma."
0 7
Others echoed the same sentiment. Doctor John Kessler, Director of
Northwestern University's Stem Cell Institute, referred to the Bush
policy not as rooted in a misguided ethical principle, but rather as a
"really, really unwelcome intrusion of politics into science."'0 8 United
States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi also denounced the Bush funding
policy in the same terms: "We've had a situation where it's faith or
105 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 185 (2003); Yuval Levin, The
Moral Challenge of Modern Science, 14 NEw ATLANTIs 32 (2006) [hereinafter Levin,
Moral Challenge], available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-moral-
challenge-of-modern-science.
106 Kurt Gottfriedl & Harold Varmus, Editorial, The Enlightenment Returns,
5921(323) SCIENCE 1538, 1538 (Mar. 2009).
107 Rob Waters & Roger Runningen, Obama to Restore 'Scientific Integrity' as Part of
Stem-Cell Shift, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 8, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aRLJP31E75FU ("We view what happened with stem-cell research in
the last administration as one manifestation of the failure to think carefully about how
government use of scientific advice occurs . . . . Public policy must be guided by
sound, scientific advice.").
"08 Brandon Keim, Bush Stem Cell Ban Wrong, but Not Anti-Science, WIRED, Mar. 11,
2009, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/obamastemcells2/.
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science - take your pick ... We're saying science is an answer to our
prayers .... We need science, science, science, science, science. " 09
U.S. Representative Diana DeGette, a key sponsor of a bill (twice
vetoed) to liberalize President Bush's funding policy for embryonic
stem cell research,"0 decried that "Itihe President's policy was based
on politics rather than science, and as we've seen the research develop
in the ensuing three years, we can really see what the problem with
that is.""' Similarly, a spokesman from the Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation (which strongly and actively supports funding for
embryonic stem cell research) noted that reversing the Bush policy
signaled the return of "scientists making scientific decisions.""' 2
Patient advocate Michael J. Fox also celebrated the reversal of the
Bush policy as "get[ting] politics out of science." " 3
At a congressional hearing in 2006, U.S. Representative Eleanor
Holmes Norton went farther than perhaps any elected official,
condemning the appeal to non-scientific considerations in a host of
public issues. She offered a withering critique of what she termed "the
unmitigated politicization of the one area that Americans always held
off from politics, and that is science itself."' 114 Holmes Norton applied
her critique to some key bioethical matters: "Whether Schiavo or
creationism, renamed Intelligent Design, or stem cell research or, God
help us, global warming itself, there are views floating around this
Congress that essentially reach conclusions on these matters of huge
scientific moment, based on their own personal beliefs."" 5
Taken together, the foregoing quotations from scientists, physicians,
public advocates, and elected officials, on their face argue for
delegating the moral, political, and legal dispute over federal funding
'09 Carla Marinucci, Pelosi Rebuts Critics, Defends Funding Plans; Stem Cell Research,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 2009, at A4.
"10 Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2005).
I" Interview by Susan Dentzer with Diana Degette, PBS NewsHour (Aug. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/july-dec04/degette.html.
.12 Daniel Callahan, Stem Cells: Science, Ethics, and Ideology, HASTINGS CENTER
BIOETHIcS F., Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.
aspx?id=3234.
113 Press Release, The Michael J. Fox Found. for Parkinson's Research, Michael J.
Fox Foundation Statements on President Obama's Executive Order Overturning Ban
on Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research (Mar. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.michaeljfox.org/newsEvents-mjfflnTheNews-article.cfm?ID=300.
14 U.S. Representative Mark Souder (R-IN) Holds a Hearing on RU-486, "Abortion
Pill," POLITICAL TRANSCRIPT WIRE, May 19, 2006, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/
coms2/summary_0286-16826420_ITM. The author testified at this hearing.
"' Yuval Levin, Science Warrior: Hillary Clinton Leaves the Facts Behind, 18 NEW
ATLANTIS 115, 118 (2007).
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for embryonic stem cell research to scientists, who will resolve it by
"scientific" means. To be clear, resolution of this question entails the
adjudication of the contested normative claims discussed above,
including the moral and legal status of the living human embryo, the
role of government in supporting morally controversial scientific
research with taxpayer dollars, allocation of scarce governmental
resources, moral complicity, the duties of citizenship, and the
common good.
At this point, one might object that the foregoing statements should
not be taken literally - the speakers cited above are not really
advocating a near-categorical deference to scientific experts in public
bioethics. Perhaps they are speaking figuratively. Perhaps what they
really mean is that one should not distort or conceal scientific data for
political purposes. Perhaps they are simply skipping a step in the
argument - they have implicitly ruled out the possibility of a
meaningful ethical dispute, and thus the only remaining questions are
empirical. Or perhaps, less charitably, they are trying to cloak their
ethical and political judgments in scientific terms in order to associate
their positions with the enormous social capital of science as an
ostensibly neutral and objective mechanism for producing knowledge.
But even granting for the sake of argument the above claims about
the true intentions of its apparent advocates, there are very good
reasons to proceed with a critique of the Maximal Deference model
nonetheless. First, it is an argument that is regularly made by
prominent public figures and, at the very least, deserves a response
because it might be taken seriously, sowing confusion or error in the
public square. Further, debunking the Maximal Deference model will
prompt its apparent advocates to think more clearly about the nature
and provenance of their judgments and to style their public arguments
accordingly, thus contributing to a more sound and transparent
democratic process of deliberation. Finally, as the following subparts
will show, the Maximal Deference model of integration for public
bioethics is not new or unserious; rather, it is a recent iteration of a
very old aspiration for "scientific governance" that has been advanced
since before the American founding by an array of esteemed thinkers.
Accordingly, it merits a serious and sustained scholarly response.
The balance of the Article thus aims to critique the Maximal
Deference model of integration for public bioethics and to
demonstrate that it is problematic for reasons relating to democratic
accountability (and thus legitimacy) and, more deeply, that it is
unsustainable in principle because of the conceptual
incommensurability in the tools of modem science and those of public
1558 [Vol. 43:1529
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bioethics. As a first step in this critique, it is necessary to locate the
above proposal in its historical and theoretical context.
B. The Genealogy of the Maximal Deference Model of Integration
American political culture derives its distinctive flavor as
much from faith in scientific and technological progress as
from a commitment - some might even say an addiction -
to resolving social conflicts through law.
- Sheila Jasanoff 16
Modern science and the American project have been deeply
intertwined since the founding era. Both were signature achievements
of the Age of Reason, when "science was ... esteemed as the highest
expression of human rationality."117 Like other Enlightenment
thinkers, the framers held the view that "no system of government or
of society could be sound and stable if it contravened any of the
fundamental principles of nature revealed by science."" l8 Since the
nation's birth, there has been tremendous optimism that America
would prove to be fertile soil for maximal scientific progress. In
return, the fruits of science would be harnessed for both the
promotion of the nation's domestic flourishing, and the projection of
its interests abroad. Some founders believed that modern science itself
could demonstrate the humanistic truths of classical liberalism in
which American democracy was ostensibly grounded. Still other
thinkers from the founding to the present day have pressed an even
more ambitious view, arguing for a political regime that is organized
and governed entirely by scientific principles.
The Maximal Deference model of integration for public bioethics seems
to emerge from this confluence of esteem for science as a rigorous,
objective, and powerful engine of producing useful knowledge,
skepticism about the governance of science by nonscientists, and
optimism about the possibility of "scientific" governance. Each
foundational component will be briefly treated in turn.
116 SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1997) (1995).
117 1. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 20 (1995). According to
political scientist David Guston, "Ibloth science and equality were born of
Enlightenment rationality." See David Guston, The Essential Tension in Science and
Democracy, 7 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 3 (1993).
118 COHEN, supra note 117, at 280.
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1. Science and the Founding Generation
Awe and optimism for the power and promise of modern science -
a key component underlying the Maximal Deference model - have
been quintessentially American traits since the nation's inception.
Many of the Founding Fathers themselves were men of science.
Benjamin Franklin was a fellow of the two most prestigious scientific
academies in the world (the Paris Academie Royale des Sciences and
the Royal Society of London)," 9 and was regarded as one of the most
important scientists of that era. 2 ' Thomas Jefferson had a lifelong
passion for science. He was President of the American Philosophical
Society (the first American scientific society, founded by Franklin). 121
Indeed, Jefferson delivered a lecture on paleontology before this body
shortly after his inauguration as the nation's second Vice President.
While Secretary of State, Jefferson commissioned and hung portraits of
science icons Sir Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon in the State
Department. 22 Though not a practitioner himself, John Adams shared
an abiding respect and interest in science. In one of his writings on
European politics he included "without explanation or transition" a
seemingly disconnected meditation on the chemistry of combustion
(weighing in on a debate between Joseph Priestly and Antoine Laurent
Lavoisier on the nature of heat) and the physics of magnetism. 123
James Madison had studied Newton at Princeton where he wrote an
essay on the "parallelism between the world of nature and the world of
human affairs." 1
24
Thomas Jefferson (along with other Enlightenment thinkers) was
optimistic that the methods of modern science (first articulated by
Bacon and powerfully demonstrated by the success of Newton) would
particularly flourish in the newly founded nation, to the great benefit
of its people:
119 Id. at 14.
120 See id. at 23.
121 Id. at 22.
122 See id. at 57. Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and John Locke were Jefferson's "trio
of immortals." Locke's portrait also hung in the state department (and later at
Monticello).
123 See id. at 304-05 ("Juxtaposed to a long set of reflections about European
politics he interposed ... a query concerning certain new discoveries in the chemistry
of combustion, a topic then being elucidated by the studies of Joseph Priestly and
Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, both good friends of Franklin's .... Adams suddenly shifts
his intellectual gears, turning abruptly from the chemistry of respiration to the physics
of magnetism. 'The loadstone [or natural magnet] is,' he wrote 'in possession of the
most remarkable, wonderful and mysterious property in nature.' ").
124 Id. at 20.
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Could the genius of Bacon place itself on the high ground of
all the sciences in their present state of advancement, and
marshal them before him in so great a country as this, and
under a government like ours, he would point out their
objects, foretell their successes, and move them on their
march .... 125
This was a view held also by Philadelphia physician, signer of the
Declaration, and delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Doctor
Benjamin Rush.126 The experience of Joseph Priestly (one of the fathers
of modern chemistry) in America, confirmed that the fledgling liberal
democracy was well suited to the thriving of science (both in practice
and application). 27 In his travels in nineteenth century America,
Alexis de Tocqueville also found the new democracy a fertile place for
science. He observed that American democracy was compatible with a
robust commitment to science, owing to the fact that in a liberal
democracy a wider array of people are free (in principle) to pursue
their interests (including scientific interests), irrespective of where
they fall in the class system.
128
The founding generation (and its intellectual forebears) regularly
invoked scientific metaphors in service of their political arguments.
James Harrington, whose Oceana is regarded as singularly influential
in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, drew upon the work of
William Harvey (discoverer of the circulation of the blood) in arguing
for a bicameral legislature. Harrington went so far as to compare the
two houses with the ventricles of the heart - both in terms of size
differential and distinctive functions. 29 In arguing against Franklin's
proposal for a unicameral legislature (and in favor of bicameralism),
John Adams invoked Newton's Third Law of Motion: 30 "The president
of Pennsylvania might, upon such an occasion. .. to have recollected
125 GEORGE H. DANIELS, SCIENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 127 (1971).
126 See Roy MacLeod, Science and Democracy: Historical Reflections on Present
Discontents, 35 MINERVA 369, 371 (1997) (noting that Rush "expected much
improvement to flow 'naturally' from the 'harmony between the sciences and
government,' in a land which Providence had appointed men to explore and settle").
127 See id. ("Joseph Priestly, fleeing a mob in England, found in America in 1794 an
attitude 'far more favourable toward the sciences and the arts than any monarchical
government has ever been. A free people will in due time produce anything useful for
mankind.' ").
128 See Guston, supra note 117, at3, 6.
129 See id. at 21.
130 Newton's Third Law (or Axiom) of Motion is: "To any action there is always an
opposite and equal reaction." ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA 417 (I. Bernard Cohen &
Anne Whitman eds. & trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1999) (1687).
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one of Sir Isaac Newton's laws of motion, namely, - 'the reaction
must always be equal and contrary to reaction,' or there can never be
any rest." 131
Many such metaphors were introduced into the deliberations at the
Constitutional Convention itself. In one instance, Madison's notes
indicate that one delegate compared the power of the federal
government to preempt state laws to the "attractive principle which
would retain ... the centrifugal force [without which] planets will fly
from their orbits." 132 Some commentators have gone so far as to
declare the Constitution to be designed according to Newtonian
principles. 33 The Federalist Papers contain additional scientific
metaphors. 134 According to historian of science, I. Bernard Cohen,
"The Founding Fathers used science as a source of metaphors because
they believed science to be a supreme expression of human reason." 135
In addition to providing a plethora of metaphors, the founders
directly invoked modern science for substantive propositions.
Jefferson argued that modern science confirmed the truth of human
equality asserted by the Declaration of Independence: "The general
spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the
131 COHEN, supra note 117, at 229. Cohen notes here, however, that Adams
misremembers the import of Newton's Third Law - Newton is referring here to the
dynamic between two forces acting on two separate bodies, not, as Adams's metaphor
implies, two forces acting on the same body with the result of equilibrium. Id.
132 Id. at 258. Montesquieu made a similar metaphor in Spirit of the Laws, writing
that in monarchies, "there is a power that constantly repels all bodies from the center,
and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it." Id. at 35.
133 See id. at 283-84. This view, however, seems to derive from a misreading of
Newton's Principia. As Cohen observes:
The fundamental working principle in Newtonian rational mechanics, as
developed in the Principia, is that orbital motion is the result of an
unbalanced force and is in no sense a case of equilibrium or balanced forces.
The Newtonian natural philosophy is concerned almost entirely with
problems of dynamics, with the science of unbalanced forces and motions or
- more exactly - forces (that is, unbalanced forces) and the motions they
generate, the changes in motions they produce. Only in one very small
section, a sort of appendix to the 'Laws of Motion,' does Newton even
introduce the subject of statics or balanced forces, that is, forces acting on
bodies that are and remain at rest. It is thus simply wrong to claim, as
Woodrow Wilson and other scholars have done, that the science of the
Principia is centered on the notion of an equipoise or balance of forces.
Id.
134 See id. at 269 (noting that in Federalist No. 10, Madison writes, "Liberty is to
faction what air is to fire, an aliment, without which it instantly expires").
131 Id. at 229.
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palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with
saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to
ride them legitimately, by the grace of God." 
136
As envisioned by Bacon, the founders meant for the powers of
science to be deployed in the new republic for the relief of man's
estate. The Constitution itself signals the view of its founders that
science was to play an integral role in the life of the new republic.
Among the limited powers enumerated by the Constitution, Congress
is explicitly charged with the power "[to promote the Progress of
Science."'137 Leon Kass has written that "[tihe American Republic is, to
my knowledge, the first regime explicitly to embrace scientific and
technical progress and to claim its importance for the public good." 1
38
2. Science and Self-Governance
Skepticism about the desirability (and even possibility) of
governance of science by lay government officials - another key
grounding for the Maximal Deference model - emerged as American
science became a profession during the nineteenth century.
Historian George H. Daniels examined the transformation in the
relationship between science, government, and the larger society from
the founding to the present. 39 In doing so, Daniels discovered the
emergence of what he has termed the "Pure Science Ideal." 4°
Daniels observed (along with Tocqueville) that in the first half of
the nineteenth century, in order to generate public support for their
work, scientists argued that their efforts were principally oriented
towards providing practical benefits to society.14' Moreover, they
claimed that "science would demonstrate God's works and a scientific
education would be conducive to a good moral education."' 42
131 Diana Schaub, Montesquieu's Popular Science, 20 NEw ATLANTIS 37, 40-41
(2008).
137 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress actualizes this power through issuance of
patents).
13' Leon R. Kass, The Problem of Technology, in TECHNOLOGY IN THE WESTERN
POLITICAL TRADITION 1, 21 (Arthur M. Melzer et al. eds., 1993).
139 See Guston, supra note 117, at 13.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Daniels further argues that "[s]cientists needed to make this argument because
it was not obviously true, they had to camouflage their activities in the colors of
American values to protect their freedom to pursue their own scientific agenda." Id. at
13-14. This public strategy had been suggested in the seventeenth century by Rene
Descartes. See RENE DESCARTES, THE DISCOURSE ON METHOD 159 (John Veitch trans.,
1930) (1637).
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However, from the latter half of that century forward as American
science advanced, its practitioners found that the pursuit of excellence
demanded increased specialization and professionalization. The notion
of science for the sake of itself - separate and apart from the practical
needs of the public - began to take hold. The concept of scientist-as-
teacher gave way to scientist-as-researcher. According to Daniels, "for
the first time, great numbers of scientific spokesmen began to vocally
resent [sic] this dependence upon values extraneous to science."
143
This Pure Science Ideal created tensions with the public and its
government representatives. This tension between the practical
demands of the public and the research agenda of scientists is
apparent in the work of the Allison Commission - a joint, bipartisan
congressional committee that investigated the activities of four federal
scientific agencies from 1884 to 1886, including claims that such
agencies were pursuing abstract research unconnected to practical
concerns."4 During the hearings, Congressman Hilary A. Herbert (an
Alabama democrat) insisted that the political branches exercise direct
democratic control over government science agencies, whereas several
scientists argued that the laymen (including government officials)
were in no position to judge the scientific legitimacy of research. 145
Thus, the professionalization of American science and its
development into an elitist meritocracy led to arguments in favor of
self-governance by scientists and insulation from democratic
influence. This theme of elitism ran through Vannevar Bush's 1945
government report, Science: The Endless Frontier, commissioned by
President Roosevelt to explore how scientific research might
contribute to the "improvement of national health, the creation of new
enterprises bringing new jobs, and the betterment of the national
standard of living."'14 6 Bush argued in the report that scientists should
be given wide latitude to oversee and direct their own research in
143 Guston, supra note 117, at 13.
' REXMOND C. COCHRANE, THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1863-1963, 144 (1978). Senator William B. Allison of Iowa chaired
the committee.
145 Testimony Before the Joint Commission to Consider the Present Organizations of the
Signal Service, Geological Survey, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Hydrographic Office,
48th Cong. 693-94 (1884) (statement of Rep. Hilary A. Herbert), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=Hocj26LFyPwC&printsec=frontcover&client=firefox
-a#v=onepage&q=&f=false.
' OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEV., SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER, 1945
(quoting letter from President Roosevelt to Doctor Bush, contained within report); see
also PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 138 (2001) (arguing that Bush
report was most "important document about the place of scientific research in a
twentieth-century democracy").
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order to build the "scientific capital" that would ultimately ensure
progress.'47 Bush's argument for unfettered free inquiry as the engine
of scientific progress was resisted by other public figures, including
Senator Harvey Kilgore (a West Virginia democrat), who argued to the
contrary that scientific research (particularly the federally funded
variety) should be oriented towards solving social problems on a
broad scale. 1
48
The argument for maximal scientific freedom and reliance on self-
governance was perhaps most powerfully articulated in 1962 by
philosopher Michael Polanyi in The Republic of Science.'49 Polanyi
famously argued that "the soil of academic science must be
extraterritorial in order to secure its control by scientific opinion."'50
According to this view, autonomy from external governmental
oversight creates the space necessary for scientific creativity to
flourish, which, in turn, yields socially useful developments. The
scientific community should thus govern itself, according to its own
internal meritocratic structures. According to Polanyi, "self
coordination of independent initiatives by the most competent assures
the most efficient possible organization of scientific progress."151
Moreover, the governance of science through the usual democratic
mechanisms is doomed to fail. In Polanyi's view scientific progress
cannot be directed; rather, it emerges organically from the creative
collaboration of the scientific community. The methods of science
cannot be articulated; they can only be transmitted by masters to
apprentices within the community itself."5 2
147 KITCHER, supra note 146, at 139. Bush was an American engineer involved in
the development of the atomic bomb and key science advisor to President Roosevelt.
148 See id., at 139-40.
149 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1(1)
MINERVA 54 (1962), available at httpiAvww.springerlink.com/content/x52241166w445660/
fulltext.pdf.
150 See id. at 67; IAN C. JARVIE, THE REPUBLIC OF SCIENCE: THE EMERGENCE OF
POPPER'S SOCIAL VIEW OF SCIENCE 1935-1945, 220 (Rodopi 2001).
'5' JARVIE, supra note 150, at 214.
152 See id. at 219; see also Guston, supra note 117, at 15-17. The elitist model for
the governance of science dates back much further in time - to the seventeenth
century writings of one of the founders of modem science, Francis Bacon. Philosopher
of Science, Philip Kitcher called Bacon's allegorical work, The New Atlantis, "the first
report on science policy." See KITCHER, supra note 146, at 137. In The New Atlantis,
Bacon describes a utopian society in which the elite scientists of Salomon's House
direct their own work, free from the intervention of the government:
We have consultations, which of the [i]nventions and [eixperiences, which
we have discovered shall be [plublished: and which not: and take all an oath
of secrecy, for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep [slecret:
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Proponents of this vision of scientific self-governance strongly
oppose extrinsic oversight of science by non-expert government
officials. This opposition is reflected in the remarks of George Ball to
the American Political Science Association in 1977:
Scientifically trained men and women are far better equipped
to decide whether and how certain types of research should be
conducted so as to safeguard [the] public interest than
legislatures or administrative tribunals or courts...
[They] should be permitted maximum freedom to decide what
research to undertake and how to undertake it, subject only to
such safeguards as they might individually or collectively
impose to prevent experiments being conducted in such a
matter as to threaten the public health or welfare."5 3
Nobel Laureate and former President of the California Institute of
Technology, David Baltimore expressed similar concerns about the
extrinsic governmental oversight of scientific research by non-experts:
The traditional pact between society and its scientists in which
the scientists is [sic] given the responsibility for determining
the direction of his work is a necessary relationship if basic
science is to be an effective endeavor. This does not mean that
society is at the mercy of science, but rather that society, while
it must determine the pace of basic scientific innovation,
should not attempt to prescribe its directions.
... First, the criteria determining what areas [of biological
research] to restrain inevitably express certain sociopolitical
attitudes that reflect a dominant ideology. Such criteria cannot
be allowed to guide scientific choices. Second, attempts to
restrain directions of scientific inquiry are more likely to be
generally disruptive of science than to provide the desired
specific restraints.'54
Though some of those we do reveal sometime to the State, and some not.
FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ATLANTIS 44 (1627).
M Sissela Bok, Freedom and Risk, 107 DAEDALUS 115, 117-118 (1997) (quoting
George Ball, Biology and Politics, Address Given to the American Political Science
Association). George Ball served as Secretary of State during Johnson and Kennedy
administrations.
'5 David Baltimore, Limiting Science: A Biologist's Perspective, 134 DAEDALUS 7, 7-8,
11 (Fall 2005).
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Bruce Jennings locates the foregoing arguments as rooted in the
proposition that "democratic citizens and their political
representatives cannot rationally manage the development of science
and technology, nor can they understand modern science and
technology sufficiently to use science effectively in other policy
areas."' 55 Thus, citizens and their representatives should "largely
defer" to the judgments of the scientific elite, and implement their
recommendations in the political process. 156
In the context of public bioethics, the threads of this new elitism
were evident in the congressional testimony of scientists and
physicians in response to Senator Mondale's proposal to create the
"President's Commission on Health Science and Society" in 1968.
South African transplant surgeon Christiaan Barnard testified that
there was no good that could come from the public meddling into the
practice of medicine and that such a committee "would be an insult to
your doctors."' 157 Owen Wangensteen, Professor Emeritus of Surgery at
University of Minnesota similarly worried about public ethical
judgments about medical practice, and argued that physicians should
police themselves in this regard - "the fellow who holds the apple
can peel it best." 5" Another surgeon, Doctor C. Walton Lillehei
likewise expressed his wish not to be ethically accountable to the
public, composed of "people frustrated with their own inability to
create." 159 Doctor Jesse Edwards, representing the American Heart
Association stated that "we do not believe that the time is ripe for a
full dress government inquiry into these complicated technical
questions." 160
As the above comments confirm, it is a short step from this new
elitism in science policy to the Maximal Deference model for public
bioethics.
'5 Bruce Jennings, Representation and Participation in the Democratic Governance
of Science and Technology, Monograph 85-14, at 8, available at http://www.law.uh.edu/
ihelg/monograph/85-14.pdf.
156 See id.
157 JONSEN, supra note 13, at 92.
158 Id. at 93.
159 Id.
160 Id. These statements prompted Mondale to exclaim in exasperation:
[AIll we are proposing here is to create a measly little study commission to
look at some very profound issues . . . . I sense an almost psychopathic
objection to the public process, a fear that if the public gets involved, it is
going to be anti-science, hostile and unsupportive.
Id. at 94.
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3. Optimism for "Scientific" Governance
The foregoing argument that, all things considered, science is best
governed by scientists, has and continues to be invoked in the
American public square. But from the American founding to the
present day there have been thinkers who have advocated an even
more ambitious proposal, namely, the importation of the premises and
methods of science directly into the process of governance itself.6 ' Put
in its strongest and most idealistic form, the claim was that "if politics
were run by scientists, all issues of moment would eventually be
depoliticized; and once reduced to science, all political questions
could be solved."' 62 The Maximal Deference model of integration for
public bioethics appears to be a weaker and more limited species of
this proposal.
The view that "there can be a science of government which is an
image of the physical or biological sciences, was widely shared in the
later eighteenth century and appears prominently in many works of
the nineteenth."'163 Those who shared this view wanted to bring the
rigor and certainty that they perceived in the fields of science and
mathematics to the political sphere. According to David Guston,
Enlightenment philosophers who heavily influenced the American
founding embraced this aspiration:
In the seventeenth century, the unity of scientific and political
investigation was forged by method. Galileo had introduced
the resolutive-compositive method and Hobbes had imported
it to England. Descartes' analytic-synthetic method was
identical, as was Locke's. This particular method comprises the
large part of the difference between the medieval mind and the
modern mind: instead of using a particular method thought
suited for a particular subject, the modern scientist applies a
universal method across subjects. 16
Prominent figures in American history have advocated such
integration of scientific methods into the political process to greater or
lesser extents. One such group, called the "Scientific Democrats,"
included philosopher John Dewey, President Herbert Hoover,
'61 For a concise overview of the various permutations of this project, see Frank
Laird, Participating in the Tension: A Response to Guston, 7(1) Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 35
(Jan. 1993).
162 Roy MacLeod, Science and Democracy: Historical Reflections on Present
Discontents, 35 MINERVA 369, 375 (1997).
163 COHEN, supra note 117, at 255.
16 Guston, supra note 117, at 10.
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physicist Robert A. Milikan, the anthropologist Franz Boas, and the
aforementioned Vannevar Bush. 165 These thinkers argued that the
premises and methods of science should be deployed in the political
sphere to alleviate human suffering:
In their optimistic view, modem science had proved its power
in practice, by harnessing natural resources and creating new
inventions such as the steam engine and the railroad, creating
an industrial society with the potential to overcome scarcity.
The task now was to apply the methods of modem science to
the improvement of social organization itself. 1
66
Dewey argued that the scientific method - "a shorthand
designation for great and ever-growing methods of observation,
experiment, and reflective reasoning" 167 - should be applied to social
and political matters. In 1946, he wrote:
Science bears exactly the same relation to the progress of
culture as to the affairs acknowledged to be technological (like
the state of invention in the case, say, of tools and machinery,
or the progress reached in the arts, say, the medical) .... A
considerable part of the remediable evils of present life are due
to the state of imbalance of scientific method with respect to
its application to physical facts on one side and to specifically
human facts on the other side . . . the most direct and effective
way out of these evils is steady and systematic effort to develop
that effective intelligence named scientific method in the case
of human transactions. 1"
This was a widely shared view in the Progressive Era. Progressives
thought governance was "a science, and it could be carried out as
dispassionately as any of the physical sciences by well educated, well
trained administrators." 169 James M. Landis, one of the key architects
of the New Deal went even further, arguing that such scientific experts
should be left alone not only to determine the means by which social
progress could be achieved, but also to decide which social ends should
165 Andrew Jewett, Science and the Promise of Democracy in America, 132(4) ON
SCIENCE 64, 67 (2003).
166 Id. at 66.
167 LEVIN, supra note 2, at 88-89 (quoting DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY
viii-ix (1920)).
168 Id. at 88.
169 GARY LAWSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40 (3d ed.
2004).
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be pursued. 7' In this way, he was advocating a program very much
akin to the Maximal Deference model of integration.
Throughout the twentieth century, various thinkers proposed a
variety of ways to incorporate science into governance in the name of
rationality and efficiency. In 1932, the Milikan Scientific Jury System
was proposed to solve the problems of the depression.'71 Under this
system, experts in the relevant fields would design and implement
such policies. Milikan later elaborated on how to execute such a
scientific approach to governance:
Those in control must either themselves be thoroughly trained
in the method of the modern correct attack on the problem of
economics, finance and government, or must at least be
willing to choose as their advisors ... the ablest, most high
minded, most competent men in those fields. That alone
constitutes the scientific approach to the problem of
government. 1
72
Relatedly, President John F. Kennedy espoused the view that most
social problems are, at bottom, technological problems beyond the
expertise of most people and "which do not lend themselves to the
great sort of 'passionate movements' which have stirred this country so
often in the past."'' 73 Instead, they are more appropriately resolved by
those with technical expertise. In a similar vein, the Task Force of the
Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and
Technology (chaired by Arthur Kantrowitz), drafted a model "Science
Court" that would evaluate contested social matters and issues
judgments concerning the relevant "scientific facts" involved.'74 Other
such proposals have included the creation of "technical review
boards," a "technological magistrature," and the office of "Certified
Public Scientist." 175
In short, throughout American history those impressed by the
extraordinary humanitarian achievements made possible by modern
science have looked to the premises and methods of science to make
170 See id.
171 See Nelkin, supra note 1, at 107.
171 Id. at 107-08 (quoting R. Millikan, Science and Social Justice, in R. TOBEY, THE
NEw SCIENCES AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University (1969)).
113 Yuval Levin, Science over All? The Temptation in Obama's Stem Cell Policy, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2009, at A13 (quoting President Kennedy).
"' Leonard A. Cole, Resolving Science Controversies: From Science Court to Science
Hearings Panel, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 244, 250
(Malcolm L. Goggin ed., 1986); see also Nelkin, supra note 1, at 108.
115 See Nelkin, supra note 1, at 108.
[Vol. 43:15291570
20101 Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration
the political sphere more efficient, rational, and productive. This same
optimism for scientific governance (reflected in the statements of
Landis, among others) undergirds the Maximal Deference model of
integration for public bioethics.
I1. SOME KEY PREMISES AND METHODS OF MODERN SCIENCE
One of the central claims of this Article is that given certain of its
key premises and methods, modern science, by design, is indifferent to
and thus incapable of supplying final answers for the normative
questions at the heart of public bioethics. As a preliminary matter, it is
necessary to provide some account of what these premises and
methods are. It must be acknowledged at the outset, however, that
given its manifold and diverse subject matter disciplines and sub-
disciplines it is difficult (if not impossible) to discuss responsibly
"modern science" in a monolithic sense. For example, the
methodologies of the biosciences differ in material respects from those
of the physical sciences. Also, distinctions are regularly drawn
between "applied" and "pure" science, though for present purposes
these will be discussed together. Moreover, since its inception, modern
science has undergone a series of developments, changes, and vexed
philosophical challenges, far too complicated and extensive to
responsibly discuss here. 176 Nevertheless, the following Part seeks to
abstract and synthesize a set of common premises and methods that
run throughout the various disciplines of modern science that render
it unfit to resolve the normative disagreements at the heart of public
bioethics. What follows is not meant to be a comprehensive exegesis
of modern science.
Modern science, as founded by Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon in
the seventeenth century, was meant to provide a powerful new
mechanism for the production of clear, demonstrable, and (above all)
useful knowledge. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes elaborated the
176 Since the seventeenth century, philosophers of science have debated and
discussed the explanatory limits and normative neutrality of science. See, e.g., DEL
RATZSCH, SCIENCE AND ITS LIMITS, 73-99 (2000); THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL
BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE (1999) (exploring why science seems
trustworthy); MARY B. HESSE, MODELS AND ANALOGIES IN SCIENCE (1963) (using models
and analogies to explore philosophy of science); JASANOFF, supra note 116, at 94-96
(discussing how Western science draws limits for its own evaluation at its boundaries
and noting that only insiders are capable of judging worth of science); KITCHER, supra
note 146, at 12-28 (discussing limitations of scientific realism throughout its history);
Dorothy Nelkin, Science Wars: Responses to a Marriage Failed, Soc. TEXT, Spring-
Summer 1996, at 93-100 (exploring what role science and scientists should take in
solving problems in science and society).
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new empirical project and distinguished it from the more abstract and
theoretical philosophical endeavors of past millennia:
So soon as I had acquired some general notions concerning
Physics ... they caused me to see that it is possible to attain
knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of that
speculative philosophy which is thought in the Schools, we
may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing
the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens,
and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know
the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way
employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and
thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.177
Descartes's great innovation for science was to set aside the vexed
"speculative" questions such as those regarding "the being or nature
or goodness of things, questions also about first or ultimate causes.""'
The new approach self-consciously abandoned the teleology of the
ancient natural philosophers who aspired to understand what things
are in themselves. 179 Thus liberated from the seemingly paralyzing
deeper questions about their purpose and meaning, science was free to
single-mindedly pursue knowledge about the composition and
function of natural things. Paradoxically, by narrowing its focus to
these more "practical" questions, Descartes amplified the power of
science to a level never before seen.
Accordingly, Descartes and Bacon set about to design a new method
of scientific inquiry aimed at how nature works. The ultimate aim of
this method was harnessing nature for humanitarian ends - to put
nature to work for humankind.80 The new method aspired to combine
exacting rational analysis with active experimentation and the
unbiased collection of empirical data. 81 Bacon placed new emphasis
177 RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES 81, 119 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds., 1981) (emphasis added).
178 LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY 279 (1985).
179 See, e.g., JOSEPH VINING, THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD: CLAIMS OF SCIENCE
AND HUMANITY 53-54 (2004) (quoting Jean Pierre Changeux, Director of Molecular
Neurobiology Laboratory of Institute Pasteur: "No one . . . takes teleological
arguments seriously anymore, at least not in biology.").
... In Bacon's words, the ultimate purpose of science was to discern how to subdue
nature for the "relief of man's estate." FRANCIS BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 42
(Albert S. Cook ed., 1904) (1605).
18 See KITCHER, supra note 146, at 109 ("Descartes emphasized the virtues of
rational analysis, both to direct the mind in discovering solutions to problems and to
frame the options experiments might discriminate. By contrast, Bacon stressed the
1572 [Vol. 43:1529
20101 Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration
on subjecting natural phenomena to rigorous experimentation,
believing that "the nature of things betrays itself more readily under
the vexations of art than in its natural freedom." 11 2 This active method
stood in stark contrast with the ancient approach to science, which
operated by more passive observation and contemplation of
phenomena in order to discern their natural ends." 3 American
philosopher John Dewey later underscored the virtues of the new
approach in contrast with the old by observing that:
Scientific principles and laws do not lie on the surface of
nature. They are hidden, and must be wrested from nature by
an active and elaborate technique of inquiry. [Thus, scientists]
must force the apparent facts of nature into forms different to
those in which they familiarly present themselves; and thus
make them tell the truth about themselves, as torture may
compel an unwilling witness to reveal what he is often
concealing."14
Untethered from theoretical concerns about ultimate meaning and
purposes in nature, and focused instead on the active empirical
pursuit of knowledge about how things work, the powers of modern
science grew exponentially. Three additional related features of
modern science have contributed substantially to its flourishing,
namely, its commitment to physicalism, reductive mechanism, and
strict adherence to epistemic rules and limits. Because these elements
bear on the fitness of modern science to adjudicate contested matters
in public bioethics, each will be discussed briefly.
importance of unprejudiced observation and patient accumulation of empirical
data.").
182 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, in THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 19, 48 (James
Spedding et al. eds., 1879).
183 See Leon R. Kass, Forbidding Science: Some Beginning Reflections, 15 Sci. &
ENGINEERING ETHICS 271, 278 (2009) [hereinafter Kass, Forbidding Science] ("Ancient
science had sought knowledge of what things are, to be contemplated as an end in
itself satisfying to the knower. In contrast, modem science seeks knowledge of how
things work, to be used as a means for the relief and comfort of all humanity, knowers
and non-knowers alike."); see also HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 854 (Leo Strauss
& Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) ("IThe modem scientific method [was]
distinguished in part from non-Baconian science by its resort to active experimentation,
in contrast to passive contemplation of nature.").
184 JOHN DEwEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 32 (1920).
1573
University of California, Davis
A. Physicalism
Modern science is committed to the axiomatic premise of
physicalism. Philosopher of science, Alex Rosenberg has noted that
physicalism is "the assumption that there is only one kind of stuff,
substance, or thing in the universe, from matter, material substance,
and physical objects, all the way down to quarks."185 All events are
thus physical events - all phenomena are physical phenomena. Put
another way, there is nothing but physical matter in the universe. This
premise is widely shared and enforced as orthodoxy by scientists
across biological disciplines.186 According to Rosenberg, for example,
"[tihe only biologists who deny physicalism are an assortment of
cranks and creationists to whom serious science pays no heed. We're
all physicalists now."' 87 This commitment to physicalism underlies
and points toward a key methodology of modern science: reductive
mechanism.
B. Reductive Mechanism
Stated generally, modern scientific explanation operates by way of
reduction. That is, its chief explanatory aspiration is to explicate
complex matters in the most simple and elemental terms. A reduction
is thus an effort to explain a macrophenomenon in terms of the
structure and function of its constitutive microphenomena."
Combining the axiom of physicalism with reductionism compels a
methodological commitment to mechanism, namely, the evaluation
and explanation of natural phenomena in terms of the structure,
actions, and interactions of their most basic physical parts.189 For the
185 ALEX ROSENBERG, DARWINIAN REDUCTIONISM OR How To STOP WORRYING AND
LOvE MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 2 (2006).
16 Rosenberg notes that the "metaphysical thesis" of physicalism is accepted by
reductionists and antireductionists alike. See Alex Rosenberg, Reductionism (and
Antireductionism) in Biology, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
BIOLOGY 120, 120 (2007); see also David L. Hull, What Philosophy of Biology Is Not, 20
SYNTHESIS 157, 164 (1969) ("The views expressed by early materialists and mechanists
were certainly overly crude, but to the extent that contemporary knowledge is
applicable to the various stages of these controversies, the mechanist-materialists were
right.").
187 ROSENBERG, supra note 185, at 4.
'8 See, e.g., PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, BRAIN-WISE: STUDIES IN NEUROPHILOSOPHY
20-21 (2002) ("[A] reduction has been achieved when the causal powers of the
macrophenomenon are explained as a function of the physical structure and causal
powers of the microphenomenon.").
" See Hull, supra note 186, at 164 ("Living creatures do what they do because of
their organization and can be understood only in terms of their organization.").
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life sciences, this approach dictates that "biological theories and the
explanations that employ them... need to be grounded in molecular
biology and ultimately physical science, for it is only by doing so that
they can be improved, corrected, strengthened, made more accurate
and more adequate, and completed."' 90
The process of inquiry prescribed by reductive mechanism requires
breaking down, pulling apart, and dissolving natural phenomena into
their discrete components so that they may be analyzed piece by piece.
Leon Kass has described the method in the following way: "For greater
precision, one works with cells or cell-free systems or, ideally, with
isolated and purified molecules. Organisms are explained in terms of
genes; vital functions are 'explained' by the motions and interactions
of nonliving molecules."19'
What do such reduced mechanistic explanations look like in the life
sciences? Nobel Laureate Francois Jacob's' 92 comments regarding the
190 ROSENBERG, supra note 185, at 4. One of the most hotly contested questions in
the philosophy of science is whether a completed reduction is possible - that is,
whether it will ever be possible to explain all natural phenomena in terms of their
structure and function at the quantum level. Such an aspiration was articulated at
various times by scientific icons such as physicist Erwin Schroedinger and biologist
Francis Crick. See, e.g., FRANCIS CRICK, OF MOLECULES AND MEN 10-14 (1966) ("The
ultimate aim of the modem movement in biology is in fact to explain all biology in
terms of physics and chemistry."); ERWIN SCHRODINGER, WHAT Is LIFE? WITH MIND AND
MATTER AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 3-4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1944)
(theorizing that living organisms can be most richly understood and explained in
terms of physics and chemistry). This rich and complex debate is far beyond the scope
of the present inquiry, but for a good introduction, see KITCHER, supra note 146, at 69-
77 (arguing against possibility of such "Unity of Science" account, and arguing, for
example, that "both biology and psychology seem to employ concepts that are not
definable in the terms of the sciences proposed as reducing them"); ROSENBERG, supra
note 185, at 153 (noting that chief obstacle to reducing biology to physics is principle
of natural selection); id. ("Any subdiscipline of biology - from paleontology to
developmental biology to population biology to physiology to molecular biology -
can uncover at best historical patterns, owing to the fact that (1) its kind vocabulary
picks out items generated by a historical process, and (2) its generalizations are always
open to being overtaken by evolutionary events."); id. ("[Tlo complete the reduction,
you need to be able to reduce the theory of natural selection to physical science.")
Rosenberg argues that this is possible, and to this end argues that principle of natural
selection is basic law of physical science. See Phillip Kitcher, The Hegemony of
Molecular Biology, 14 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 195, 196-206 (1999) (articulating anti-
reductionist view that sees molecular studies as important part of, but not whole of,
contemporary biology); Philip Sloan, The Biophysics of Life, Lecture Series at Notre
Dame Law School (Nov. 9, 2006).
Kass, Forbidding Science, supra note 183, at 283.
192 The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1965, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-
prizes/medicine/laureates/1965/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2009). Jacob shared the 1965
Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine with Jacques Monod and Andre Lwoff for
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definition of "life" offer some insight: "Biologists no longer study life
today. They no longer attempt to define it. Instead, they investigate
the structure of living systems, their function, their history .... The
qualities, function and development of a living organism thus simply
express interactions between its components."
' 193
American philosopher John Searle echoed this conclusion when he
declared that "Ithe world] consists entirely of physical particles in
fields of force, and some of these particles are organized into systems
that are conscious biological beasts such as ourselves."'94 Similarly,
Australian philosopher of science, JJ.C. Smart has written that
"[l]iving creatures are just very complicated physio-chemical
mechanisms."1
9 5
Reductive mechanism has been an enormously successful program
for modern science. Indeed, as Alex Rosenberg has observed, "the
history of science, or at least, physical science since the seventeenth
century, is the history of successive successful reductions."196
Moreover, reductive mechanism is widely viewed as "the most
powerful way to correct, deepen and broaden scientific theory. And,
by and large, it is the only way to make technology based on it reliable
enough to employ."'97
C. Strict Adherence to Epistemic Rules
The final feature of modern science relevant to the present inquiry is
its commitment to strictly adhere to the epistemic rules prescribed by
its own framework. That is, it single-mindedly focuses on only that
their work on the genetic control of enzyme and virus synthesis.
' VINING, supra note 179, at 9. Searle continued: "[Slystems are collections of
particles where the spatio-temporal boundaries of the system are set by causal
relations .... Babies, elephants, and mountain ranges are .... examples of systems."
Id. at 8.
'94 Stephen D. Smith, Science, Humanity, and Atrocity: A Lawyerly Examination, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2006).
195 Id. at 1306.
196 ROSENBERG, supra note 185, at 4-7 (mentioning, for example, Newton's
reduction of the astronomical discoveries of both Kepler and Galileo to his Laws of
Motion; reduction of Newtonian physics to a special cases of quantum physics and
relativity theory; the twentieth century effort "to show ... gravitational force and the
forces between subatomic particles are all variations on a single underlying process
that manifests itself in a variety of ways"; and the work of twentieth century physicists
and chemists, who "showled] that the regularities of chemical synthesis could
increasingly be explained and predicted by reducing them to regularities of atomic and
subatomic bonding, which in turn were reduced to regularities of quantum
mechanics").
191 Id. at 7.
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species of knowledge that it produces by its narrow (yet extremely
powerful) methodology. Modern science (which is not, of course to
say, modern scientists) is deliberately indifferent to and does not
recognize arguments or conclusions falling outside its framework. As
Frank Laird has observed: "That science is epistemologically
exclusionary seems beyond dispute, if one understands these terms to
mean that certain theories, modes of discourse, and methods garner
no respect in scientific debates." 98
The "speculative" questions that Descartes originally tabled about
the goodness (or badness), purposes, or ultimate meaning of natural
things remain tabled. As David Hull, an iconic figure within the
philosophy of science declared in his seminal essay of 1969, What the
Philosophy of Biology Is Not, "from the point of view of contemporary
biology, both vitalism and teleology are stone-cold dead."19 Problems
that cannot be reconceived and solved by the tools of science are not
explored. Thus, modern science is "not the representation and
demonstration of truth, but an art: the art of finding the truth - or,
rather, that portion of truth that lends itself to be artfully found.
200
Moreover, the knowledge produced by modern science is meant to be
value-neutral. 2 1 As Stephen Jay Gould famously said, "the
magisterium of science covers the empirical realm: what the Universe
is made of (fact) and why does it work in this way (theory)," and is
silent on "questions of ultimate meaning and moral value."
20 2
This disciplined commitment to the epistemic framework of modern
science has been a key to its flourishing. As Leon Kass has observed,
"science of nature that has made enormous progress precisely by its
metaphysical neutrality and its indifference to questions of being,
cause, purpose, inwardness, hierarchy, and the goodness or badness of
things, scientific knowledge included." 23 As will be shown below,
198 Laird, supra note 161, at 36; see also Guston, supra note 117, at 50 ("Science is a
plural array of disciplines, but it is exclusionary in its refusal to accept some 'marginal'
or 'boundary' enterprises.").
199 See Hull, supra note 186, at 163.
200 Leon R. Kass, Science, Religion, and the Human Future, COMMENT., Apr. 2007, at
147 [hereinafter Kass, Science].
201 See id. (noting how its ostensible neutrality makes modem science "perfectly
adapted for, technical application" and confirms Hans Jonas's observation that
"modem science contains manipulability at its theoretical core"). The premise that
modem science is normatively neutral has been powerfully challenged by a diverse
array of scholars. See generally JASANOFF, supra note 116; KITCHER, supra note 146;
Laird, supra note 161; Levin, Moral Challenge, supra note 105.
202 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, RoCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE FULLNESS OF
LIFE 3 (1999).
203 Kass, Science, supra note 200, at 38-39.
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however, these self-imposed epistemic limitations which have fueled
science's power as a producer of useful knowledge render the Maximal
Deference approach an unsustainable model of integration for public
bioethics.
D. A Brief Word on the Non-Scientific Virtues of Scientists
Before proceeding to a critique of the Maximal Deference model in
light of the above discussion of the premises and methods of science,
it is necessary to say a brief word in defense of science and its
practitioners. The foregoing account shows that modern science is, by
design, indifferent to questions of value, purposes, ends, and meaning.
The same, manifestly, cannot be fairly said of scientists or the scientific
community. As noted above, the roots of modern science are clearly
embedded in the humanitarian aspiration to relieve human suffering
and advance knowledge. Moreover, the scientific community is a great
exemplar of human virtues. Leon Kass has enumerated several such
virtues including:
[Elnterprise (in imagining new possibilities), self-discipline
and perseverance (in doggedly pursuing a line of
experimentation), courage (in risking failure), measure and
judiciousness (in weighing evidence), and intellectual probity
and integrity (in reporting data, crediting others, and giving an
honest account to one's sources of financial support) ... [as
well as] openness, trust, and (within the limits of scientific
competition) generous sharing of materials and data. 2"
While these virtues are unintelligible in the language of science
itself, they are amply exhibited in the work of good scientists.
Moreover, these virtues make scientists invaluable participants in the
public square, especially on matters relating to bioethics. Nothing in
this Article should therefore be construed as denigrating the virtues or
morality of scientists or the scientific community, or as suggesting that
scientists should be excluded from deliberations on matters of public
bioethical import. Quite the contrary - they are indispensible to a
healthy polity.
204 Id. at 43.
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IV. THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF MAXIMAL DEFERENCE AS A MODEL OF
INTEGRATION FOR PUBLIC BIOETHICS
A. A Brief Word on Maximal Deference and Democratic Legitimacy
There are prudential reasons to be cautious about the Maximal
Deference model of integration, given its strong (indeed, seemingly
categorical) default rule of delegation of public bioethical matters to
scientists. Just as in other contexts, the broad delegation of important
questions by public officials to a small community of experts raises
important questions about democratic accountability, and by
extension, legitimacy. Such concerns are complex and worthy of study
in themselves. But they are outside the scope of the present critique,
which focuses instead on the model's essential, insuperable defects
(i.e., the problem of incommensurability, discussed below).
Nevertheless, these prudential issues bear mentioning briefly, if only
to flag for future consideration.
Leon Trachtman has observed that it is a first principle of liberal
democratic theory that:
[A]ll power in a democracy flows from the people to and
through their elected representatives. The people of a
democratic society reserve to themselves the power, both
directly and through their representatives, to influence public
policy decisions and ultimately to govern the conduct of all
social institutions which impinge on their lives.
20 5
For the exercise of power to be legitimate, it must respect this
principle. Thus, if public questions are delegated to a community of
experts, political accountability and oversight are indispensible to
preserving legitimacy. As Dorothy Nelkin has written, "[dlemocratic
principles require that individuals be involved in the formulation and
determination of policies affecting them.
20 6
This is a fortiori true of public bioethics. First, the questions
presented in public bioethics are matters of concern for all people in a
democracy, lay and expert alike. Individuals rightly have strong
opinions about the moral meaning of human life (and death), how
science should be limited (or promoted) in the name of ethics, and
what the proper ends of medicine are. Moreover, lay citizens provide
much of the funding (directly or indirectly) for research in the
205 Leon E. Trachtman, Science and Technology: Who Governs?, in GOVERNING
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 141 (Malcolm L. Goggin ed., 1986).
206 See Nelkin, supra note 1, at 108.
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biosciences that gives rise to public bioethical questions. 27 Also, such
developments have concrete consequences for the whole society.
Those consequences might include actual physical changes to the
human gene pool (as in germline genetic modification), or the social
disruptions wrought by new knowledge - "truth, like death, is no
respecter of person, status or hierarchy. ' 20 8 Taking these matters out of
the public's hands and reposing them in an elite community risks
eroding democratic principles and raising the specter of what Karl
Bracher has called the "frightful image of a mere technocracy, a rule by
the managers and functionaries, which would evade control and the
entire realm of democratic-parliamentary decision-making.
219
Also, modern theories of administrative agency behavior provide
good reason to be cautious about the Maximal Deference model of
integration for public bioethics. As noted above, some progressives in
first half of the twentieth century took the view that "agencies could
be staffed with professional, dispassionate technocrats who could
govern intelligently and scientifically."'2 10 By the second half of the
twentieth century, however, the reality of the administrative state
called into question Landis's judgment that the rigor and neutrality of
science could be translated into governance. It became clear that
"agencies did not in fact (or at least did not always in fact)
scientifically identify an uncontroversial conception of the public
interest and then seek to attain it in disinterested technocratic
fashion. ' 211 Indeed, theorists came to realize that "agency capture" by
the regulated industry was a recurrent feature of agency behavior,
notwithstanding the staffing of such agencies with scientific experts.
2 12
According to Gary Lawson:
207 See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 205, at 141 (discussing how lay citizens elect
representatives, who make funding decisions).
208 JARVIE, supra note 150, at 225.
209 See Nelkin, supra note 1, at 108-09.
210 LAWSON, supra note 169, at 40.
211 Id. at 45. Additionally, arguments about the explanatory limits of science
discussed in KITCHER, supra note 146, at 85-91 (e.g., Kitcher's arguments about the
subjectivity of scientific "significance," the realist-antirealist debate, etc.) counsel
skepticism about "scientific governance."
212 See LAWSON, supra note 169; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1060-67 (1997). Another lesson to be
drawn from the experience of administrative agencies is that scientists often disagree
about empirical conclusions, and even more frequently on matters relating to
normative questions. See, e.g., George J. Graham, Jr., The Necessity of the Tension, 7
Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 25, 30 (1993).
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By the early 1960s, [agency capture by the regulated industry]
was almost universally regarded as the norm for agency
behavior. The expectation, from almost everyone on every part
of the political spectrum was that agencies would engage in
narrowly industry-serving behavior, and that the regulatory
process would, if left to its own devices, serve the interests of
powerful economic groups at the expense of the broader
public by providing an engine for legal cartelization.213
This insight counsels extreme caution for the context of public
bioethics, where the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries
have enormous financial stakes riding on the resolution of contested
issues of governance.
The foregoing represents only some of the prudential concerns for
the Maximal Deference model of integration for public bioethics - or
indeed any approach to governance in which crucial normative
questions are delegated to an elite enclave of experts. These problems
regarding political accountability and democratic legitimacy may or
may not be insuperable. But the Maximal Deference model of
integration fails for a more fundamental and decisive reason - the
problem of incommensurability between the premises and methods of
science outlined above and the ethical concepts that comprise the
currency of public bioethics.
B. The Problem of Incommensurability
The typical imperative from biology is not "Thou ... shalt,"
but "If... then ... else"
- Steven Pinker
14
[So much in law.., quietly mixes the "is" and the "ought."
- Steven D. Smith215
213 See LAWSON, supra note 169, at 40.
214 STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 27 (2004).
215 Steven D. Smith, Legal Scholarship as Resistance to "Science" 2 (Univ. of San Diego
Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 32), available
at http:/law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1042&context=sandiegolwps.
("[Tlhe question [of why one should engage in legal scholarship] quietly mixes the 'is'
and the 'ought'.").
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'Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down?
That's not my department,' says Wernher von Braun.
- Tom Lehrer
16
Why is the Maximal Deference model of integration for public
bioethics unsustainable in principle? Simply stated, its one-size-fits-all
default rule of delegation fails because modem science is designed to
be indifferent to many (perhaps all) of the vexed public questions at
the heart of this domain. For the reasons discussed above, the analytic
power of modern science depends on this indifference to questions of
ultimate meaning, purpose, and value. But public bioethics is, at
bottom, the adjudication of precisely these kinds of questions. By way
of review, modem science is axiomatically committed to physicalism
and operates by means of reductive mechanism. Most important for
public bioethics, modern science operates by strict adherence to well-
defined epistemic rules - ignoring concepts and arguments that fall
outside of its framework for the production of knowledge. By contrast,
the currency of public bioethics are ethical concepts such as
personhood, autonomy, beneficence, justice, and equality. These
terms cannot be found the lexicon of the modern physical and life
sciences. They are scientifically unintelligible.
For illustration of this point, it is useful to turn back to the previous
example of the debate over federal funding for embryonic stem cell
research. As discussed above, this debate - the defining issue for
public bioethics of the last decade - involves a normative
disagreement on many fronts. First, there is the question of the moral
status of the human embryo that is intentionally disaggregated and
destroyed in embryonic stem cell research. Is the embryo, simply by
virtue of the fact that it is a living member of the human species (i.e., a
human organism) entitled to moral respect and legal protection? Or
must a given embryo satisfy additional criteria for "personhood" (e.g.,
developmental benchmarks, being "wanted" by a potential gestational
parent, etc.) in order to merit moral regard and legal protection? Is it
consistent with the norms of equality and justice to conscript a
member of the human species into experimentation that necessarily
entails his or her demise? What about scientific freedom? What about
the humanitarian aspiration to pursue cures for diseases and injuries?
What about the desire for knowledge for the sake of itself? What about
respect for pluralism and coerced complicity of taxpayers? What about
216 TOM LEHRER, WERNHER VON BRAUN [Reprise/Warner Bros. Records 1965], in
KITCHER, supra note 146, at 89.
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the duties of citizenship and living with the consequences of
elections? Thus, at the very least, the federal funding of embryonic
stem cell research issues involves contested normative claims
involving concepts including personhood, equality, autonomy, justice,
and beneficence.217 Of what help is modern science in this context?
On the surface, it would seem that modem science might offer a
great deal of assistance. It can clarify the biological properties of the
embryo. For example, modern embryology confirms that the embryo
is a living, self-directing, integrated, whole member of the species
homo sapiens - a human organism." 8 Modern science can also inform
speculation about the promise of embryonic stem cell research to yield
highly useful knowledge relevant to human development and perhaps
regenerative therapies. Modem science thus adds value by filling in
some of the terms of the normative debate.
But what about the decisive questions - Who counts as a person?
Who gets to do the counting? How to understand the relationship
between our obligations (if any) to human embryos and to those
future patients who might be helped by embryonic stem cell research?
What about the consciences of taxpayers? What does modern science
have to say about these matters? It is useful to consider such questions
individually.
What does science have to say about "persons"? As Steven D. Smith
has written: "The premises and methods of science appear to dissolve
'persons' as a discrete ontological category. A person is now conceived to
be, basically, an exquisitely complex system of particles."219 This
reduction does not help to draw moral distinctions among embryonic,
fetal, and post-natal human beings. If anything, it muddies the ethical
picture further. A completed reduction (if such a thing is possible) might
even blur the distinction between "living" and "non-living" beings.
217 These ethical principles should be familiar to any student of bioethics - they
overlap with those announced by the National Commission in its seminal Belmont
Report - respect for persons, beneficence, and justice, and incorporated into the
Common Rule at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1991). See OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH,
THE BELMONT REPORT (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT]. These principles were
refined and extended by Jim Childress and Tom Beauchamp into what have become
known as the "Georgetown Principles." See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2001).
218 Though, as Philip Kitcher points out, biological classification (along with the
definition of scientific significance) is largely a function of scientific capacities and
subjective interests. Nature does not divide itself into categories; such categories are
imposed by scientists according to the abilities and needs. The taxonomies of the
biosciences thus differ from those of the physical sciences. See KITCHER, supra note
146, at 78-81.
219 STEVEN D. SMITH, LAw'S QUANDARY 28 (2004).
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How about "equality"? Yuval Levin has concisely captured the
explanatory limits of modern science vis-a-vis human equality:
Science, simply put, cannot account for human equality, and
does not offer reasons to believe we are all equal. Science
measures our material and animal qualities, and it finds them
to be patently unequal. We are, after all, obviously not all
equally large or small, tall or short, strong or weak, healthy or
ill. We are born physically and mentally unequal, and always
remain so. To examine only our animal qualities is surely to
conclude that we are far from one another's equals. And so to
assume that there is nothing more to us than our animal
qualities (as the modern scientific outlook does) is to assume
inequality is the human condition.22°
It would seem, therefore, that modern science does not shed light on
the normative entailments of human equality as applied to embryonic
stem cell research - or any other context for that matter.
What about the ethical principles of "beneficence" (the injunction
to do no harm, and to maximize benefits while minimizing harms) 221
and "justice" (the normative framework for allocating the burdens and
benefits of embryonic stem cell research)? 2 2 To evaluate what
beneficence or justice requires in this context, one must have an ex-
ante conception of what constitutes "the good" or perhaps, less
ambitiously, which goods should be pursued. And, moreover, one
must have a prior conception of what constitutes a harm (or harms) to
be avoided. But these are not questions about physical objects that
admit of resolution through the method of reductive mechanism. As
Leon Kass has written:
On the scientific view of the world, there can be no
knowledge, properly so-called, of these matters, no
knowledge, strictly speaking, about the purpose or meaning of
human life, about human flourishing, or even about ethics:
opinions about good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and
vice have no cognitive status and are not subject to rational
220 LEVIN, supra note 2, at 97.
221 See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 217, Part C.2.
222 See id. The debate over the scope and substance of "justice" may be the most
vexed question in political theory. The Belmont Report offered a very brief summary
of the perennial competing approaches to these questions: "These formulations are (1)
to each person an equal share, (2) to each person according to individual need, (3) to
each person according to individual effort, (4) to each person according to societal
contribution, and (5) to each person according to merit." Id. Part C.3.
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inquiry - they are, as we are fond of saying, values, merely
subjective. As scientists we can, of course, determine more or
less accurately what it is different people believe to be good,
but we are, as scientists, impotent to judge between them.
Even political science, once the inquiry into how men ought to
live communally, now studies only how they do live and the
circumstances that move them to change their ways. Man's
political and moral life is studied not the way it is lived, but
abstractly and amorally, like a mere physical phenomenon.223
Not only does modern science not provide a definitive answer as to
the question of "who" (if anyone) is harmed in embryonic stem cell
research, but it remains silent on the question of what constitutes
"benefit" and "harm" in the first instance.
The ultimate problem is that public bioethics involves normative
disputes about ends, moral meaning, and value. But as George Graham
has noted, "science cannot deduce or produce scientific conclusions
concerning the appropriate goals or purposes of public policy. It can at
best produce better understanding of causes and effects that surround
those things that government policy will affect."224 Frank Fukuyama
points to an alternative array of disciplines as more fitting to supply
ends, and offer tools to judge among competing purposes: "It is only
'theology, philosophy, or politics' that can establish the ends of science
and the technology science produces, and pronounce on whether
those ends are good or bad." '225
Thus, it would seem that modern science is most suited to
answering the empirical questions that attend public bioethical issues.
223 KASS, supra note 178, at 44. One might be able to provide a backwards-looking
etiological, evolutionary account of how these concepts arose in human behavior and
speculate as to their past value as adaptations, but as Brian Leiter and Michael
Weisberg have persuasively argued, it does not yet seem that such insights will have
value for debates about the ends to which human behavior should be directed in a
forward-looking sense. At the most, this discipline might shed light on what
mechanisms of social control are most efficacious. See Brian Leiter & Michael
Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant to Law (Univ. Texas Sch.
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 89, Oct. 2007). Similarly, one
might be able to give a descriptive neurological account of the brain's pattern of
activation when people act justly (or unjustly) or reflect on questions of justice, but
this seems of limited use to the humanistic question of what kinds of actions justice
prescribes or prohibits.
224 George J. Graham, Jr., The Necessity of the Tension, 7 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 25, 30
(1993).
225 FUKUYAMA, supra note 105, at 185. John D. Kraemer and Lawrence 0. Gostin
make a similar argument in their article, Science, Politics, and Values: The Politicization
of Professional Practice Guidelines, JAMA Mar. 2009, at 665-67, 666.
1585
University of California, Davis
Conversely, modern science does not seem to be well designed to
adjudicate those issues in public bioethics that involve ethical
deliberations about matters such as meaning, purpose, value, the
requirements of justice, the demands of equality, and respect for
persons. This insight points towards a provisional way forward for
integrating science and public bioethics, which will be discussed in
Part V below. But first it is useful to discuss briefly the perils of
ignoring the problem of incommensurability outlined above. That is,
there are grave risks associated with trying to wield science to
adjudicate matters of public bioethics, as the Maximal Deference
model prescribes.
C. Ignoring the Problem of Incommensurability: The Human Costs of
Maximal Deference
The preceding subpart concludes that the premises and methods of
science preclude its use as a tool to adjudicate public bioethical disputes
that are ultimately grounded in normative disagreements involving
moral, humanistic concepts (such as equality, justice, beneficence, and
personhood.). Thus, the Maximal Deference model of public bioethics is
unsound in principle, because it tries to harness science in this
misguided way. This conclusion is strengthened when one considers the
consequences of ignoring the conceptual incommensurability and
pressing forward with the Maximal Deference model.
Modern science is, by design, indifferent to normative claims about
purposes, moral meaning, and value. What happens when science
nevertheless tries to grapple with these questions using only its own
internal resources (as the Maximal Deference model prescribes)?
There appear to be two possibilities. One possibility is that
decisionmakers might smuggle in unstated normative principles to
adjudicate public bioethical questions while purporting to apply
scientific judgment alone. A recent report by the Bipartisan Policy
Center's Science for Policy Project pejoratively terms this the "science
made me do it" approach to policymaking.226 Alternatively, given the
unintelligibility of the humanistic concepts and principles of public
bioethics in the scientific framework, one might be tempted to flatten
or abandon such concepts altogether. Both alternatives pose serious
risks for public bioethics.
226 BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, SCIENCE FOR POLICY PROJECT: IMPROVING THE USE OF
SCIENCE IN REGULATORY POLICY 4 (2009).
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1. Smuggling Unstated Norms
What normative goods might slip into scientific reasoning in the
context of public bioethics? The most obvious candidate is the
goodness of health and its preservation. This, indeed, was the
humanitarian aspiration that fueled the development of modern
science from its inception. Descartes was explicit in his judgment that
the most compelling aspiration for human beings is "the conservation
of health, which is without doubt the primary good and foundation of
all other goods of this life."227 Since the seventeenth century, health
has been a principle good animating discussions and debates on
ethical issues connected to the biosciences. This is a fortiori true of
public bioethics. The goodness of health, for example, has grounded
the arguments in favor of federally funding embryonic stem cell
research. 22
8
There is, of course, nothing intrinsically wrong about invocation of
health as an animating good in public bioethics discourse. Indeed,
among all the goods that populate debates over public bioethics,
health might very well command the greatest consensus as a worthy
aspiration. But the good of health does not emerge from scientific
reasoning. It cannot, for reasons discussed above. 22' To claim that its
status as a primary ethical good is derivable by scientific means is to
engage in a kind of public deception (perhaps also a kind of self-
deception). To frame the ethical judgment that health should occupy a
place of privilege in our debates over bioethics as a scientific claim is
gravely misleading. It is understandable why someone would do this
- science enjoys enormous social capital as a rigorous and more
importantly, objective form of reasoning. Scientific conclusions
therefore enjoy a standing in American society that other claims lack.
But to make an ethical claim under the auspices of scientific reasoning
corrupts and degrades the public square, which, at a minimum,
requires participants to be honest and forthright about the sources of
their claims.
Worse still, the invocation of health as a morally neutral,
scientifically-derived good may have corrupting effects for the process
of governance itself. It could degrade the notion of self-government,
and creates the illusion that democracy can be replaced by science.
Yuval Levin captures this peril in the following passage:
227 REN8 DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 49 (Richard Kennington trans., Focus
Publ'g 2007) (1637).
228 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 184-202 and accompanying text.
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If health and power over nature are the highest human goods,
then surely science (as opposed to politics) must be the
primary instrument of our fulfillment. Science, far more than
politics, directs itself squarely to advancing these goods, and to
the extent that politicians try to govern science, they may
interfere with that great purpose. For this reason, there has
long been an inclination to see science as beyond the reach of
politics - an inclination encouraged by the fathers of modern
science, and one that has established itself firmly in the
political mindset. This inclination is perhaps the most
fundamental threat to self-government in our time, and among
the most profound moral challenges posed by the modern
scientific project.23°
Thus, smuggling of unstated norms into public bioethical discourse
dressed up as scientific judgments is corrosive to self-governance. The
Maximal Deference model of integration for public bioethics opens the
door to this grave risk.
2. Flattening and Abandoning Ethical Principles
Instead of smuggling ethical norms into public bioethical discourse
under the guise of scientific conclusions, those wielding science alone
to "do bioethics" might be tempted simply to exclude as unintelligible
any ethical principle that falls outside of the scientific framework
(which is to say all of them). This happens when the strict adherence
to the epistemic rules of modern science is generalized to public
bioethics. Because it is impossible for modern science to give a
normative account of good, evil, equality, justice, beneficence, and
even "persons," such principles are either flattened into mere artifacts
produced by the brain (as shaped by evolution) or stripped of their
230 LEVIN, supra note 2, at 13-14.
231 By a "normative account," I mean one that supplies insight into the ends to
which such concepts are oriented. This is to be distinguished from a descriptive
account, including for example, an evolutionary biological explanation as to how a
particular conception emerged in the past, or a neurobiological account of how the
brain produces or judges behavior to be good, bad, just, unjust, etc. These descriptive
accounts of how such concepts came to be as a historical matter or how they emerge
from the structure and function of the brain do not supply moral prescriptions for
conduct and its regulation. At the most, they might be useful in identifying the best
means to pursue a normative end. But an account of "how something works" in a
mechanistic sense - or even "why was this characteristic successful to the survival
and reproduction of this organism in the past" - is not the same as "what is it for" in
a moral sense.
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rich normative meaning. The jump is thus made from the
"methodological[] indifferen[ce] to questions of better and worse" to
the conclusion that such "indifference [is] substantively reflected in
the nature of things." '232 Stephen Jay Gould reflects this inclination in
his statement that "[niature was not constructed as our eventual
abode, didn't know we were coming (we are, after all, interlopers of
the latest geological microsecond), and doesn't give a damn about us
(speaking metaphorically). '233
Preeminent scientists (and sympathetic philosophers) have
illustrated what the landscape looks like once stripped of its moral
meaning. Nobel laureate Steven Weisberg noted that "the more the
universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless.
2 34
To which astronomer Margaret Geller replied, "Why should it have a
point? .... It's just a physical system, what point is there?" 235 Citing
Baruch Spinoza, Jean Pierre Changeux, director of the Molecular
Neurobiology Laboratory of the Institute Pasteur agrees "Nature
proposes no end to its operations . . . all final causes are only pure
fictions imagined by men."236 Another Nobel Laureate Francis Crick
concurs: "[Y]our joys and your sorrows, your memories and your
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their
associated molecules.
237
Moreover, Nobel Laureate Francois Jacob has asserted that
[T]he way of viewing life and the human being has gradually
changed. We can see how both have become subjects of
research instead of revelation .... The intention of a psyche
has been replaced by the translation of a message .... An
organism is merely a transition, a stage between what was and
what will be. Reproduction represents both the beginning and
the end, the cause and the aim .... [B]iology has
demonstrated that there is no metaphysical entity hidden
behind the word "life.
238
232 KASS, supra note 178, at 44.
233 Stephen Jay Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria, 106 NAT. HIST. 16, 25 (1997).
234 Steven WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUTES 154 (1977) (quoted in VINING,
supra note 179, at 11).
235 Steven WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY 255 (1992) (quoted in VINING,
supra note 179, at 11).
236 VINING, supra note 179, at 52.
237 FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE
SOUL 3 (1994).
238 VINING, supra note 179, at 51 (quoting FRANCOISJACOB, THE LOGIC OF LIFE ix, 2,
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This reduced and flattened understanding of longstanding
humanistic principles is reflected in an argument made by members of
the International Academy of Humanism (composed of renowned
scientists including Francis Crick, Richard Dawkins, and E.O. Wilson)
in favor of human cloning (another key contemporary debate in public
bioethics):
What moral issues would human cloning raise? Some world
religions teach that human beings are fundamentally different
from other mammals - that humans have been imbued by a
deity with immortal souls, giving them a value that cannot be
compared to that of other living things. Human nature is held
to be unique and sacred .... As far as the scientific enterprise
can determine,. . . [hiumanity's rich repertoire of thoughts,
feelings, aspirations, and hopes seems to arise from
electrochemical brain processes, not from an immaterial soul that
operates in ways no instrument can discover .... Views of
human nature rooted in humanity's tribal past ought not to be
our primary criterion for making moral decisions about
cloning.... [1it would be a tragedy if ancient theological
scruples should lead to a Luddite rejection of cloning.239
What is wrong with abandoning ethical concepts as invalid because
they cannot be demonstrated or illuminated by the tools of science
(beyond a merely descriptive account)? First, such abandonment
seems to result from confusing the self-consciously designed epistemic
limits and normative neutrality of modern science with the limits of
knowledge or understanding more generally. Descartes placed moral
questions outside the ambit of modern science in order to free its
massive analytic powers to explore the composition and function of
natural things. Finding such moral questions outside the reach of the
tools of modern science, some scientists and philosophers have thus
concluded that these questions (and the concepts on which they
depend) are meaningless. This seems to be a species of confusing the
familiar with the necessary - confusing postulates with proofs. It
appears to be a kind of epistemic provincialism.
But the nullification or radical reduction of ethical concepts in
public bioethical discourse is worse than just an error in reasoning -
there are serious consequences for humankind. What does the
306 (Betty E. Spillman trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1973)).
239 Leon R. Kass, A More Perfect Human: The Promise and Perils of Modem
Science, Lecture Delivered at U.S. Holocaust Museum (June 19, 2006), available at
http://www.humanlife.net/view-reports.htm?rpid= 13.
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governance of science and medicine in the name of ethics look like in
a system without a rich conception of equality, justice, beneficence,
autonomy, or even persons? How might the weakest and most
vulnerable among us fare in such a regime? How could one defend
even those humanitarian aspirations that modern science was
developed to serve? Under such an approach, what is science for?
What is medicine for? For that matter, what are government and law
for? Modern science provides no way to answer these questions. And
thus some are tempted to regard these questions as meaningless. This
conclusion is perhaps the gravest risk of the Maximal Deference model
of integration for public bioethics.
V. A PROVISIONAL WAY FORWARD: POLICING THE BOUNDARIES OF
SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL REASONING IN PUBLIC BIOETHICS
The foregoing has argued that the Maximal Deference model of
integration for public bioethics is, in principle, unsustainable. What
role, then, should science play in public bioethics? Obviously, wise
governance in any context must rely on the most rigorously gathered
and tested empirical data that modern science can provide. And such
empirical findings must never be distorted or mischaracterized for
political ends. But beyond these obvious commonsense observations,
how can science enter public bioethics in a constructive way without
corrupting the process of governance or becoming corrupted itself?
Given the widely divergent and indeed incommensurable relationship
between the premises and methods of modern science and the
humanistic concepts at the heart of public bioethics, a working
relationship between the two depends on restricting their application
to their respective competencies. Thus, sound public bioethics
depends on establishing and then policing the boundaries between
science and ethics for this domain of governance. 2 °
How can this be done? A good point of departure is the recent
report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's Science for Policy Project,
which recommends that government officials "explicitly differentiate,
to the extent possible, between questions that involve scientific
judgments and questions that involve judgments about economics,
ethics and other matters of policy. ' 24 1 How can such lines be drawn?
240 I am indebted to Scott Brewer for the metaphor of "policing the boundaries."
Kraemer and Gostin use a similar metaphor (borrowed from Establishment Clause
jurisprudence) when they argue for a "wall of separation ... between science, norms,
and politics." See Kraemer & Gostin, supra note 225, at 667.
241 BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, supra note 226, at 4 (referring to administrative
agencies).
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The foregoing sections discussing the distinctive features of modern
science and public bioethics illuminate a way forward.
A. Defining Boundaries of Competency
Modern science is most useful in clarifying the factual predicates
that underlie a normative debate. The powers of modem science reach
their acme in matters of measurement, prediction, and to a somewhat
lesser extent, control of natural phenomena. This is precisely what the
methods of modern science were designed to do - disaggregate,
reduce, analyze, model, and draw conclusions about how things work
in terms of their physical structure and function.
Ethical reflection and argument is most useful in negotiating among
and applying the humanistic principles that comprise the currency of
public bioethics, such as equality, justice, autonomy, beneficence, and
persons. Public bioethical reasoning seeks to discern when, how, and
most importantly, why the government should regulate the behavior of
people and institutions, in light of the moral meaning of advances in
biomedical science and biotechnology, how such advances stand in
relation to what (and who) human beings are in a normative sense
(and, by extension, how they should be treated), and what the
common good requires."'
The choice of whether and how to deploy modem science or ethical
argument therefore depends on the kind of public bioethical question that
is under consideration. One size manifestly does not fit all, contrary to the
prescriptions of the Maximal Deference model. If the public question
ultimately pertains to a normative matter, the problem of
incommensurability precludes science from offering a decisive answer. If
the public question, by contrast, is reducible to an empirical matter, then
modem science should be deployed to offer the best possible answer.
Integration for public bioethics is thus an exercise in identifying and
understanding the kind of public question being asked and discerning
whether or not it admits of being answered by means of science. To
facilitate clarity of thought in this regard, it is useful to formalize the
array of possible relationships between the types of questions that
arise in public bioethics and science's capacity to provide answers. To
this end, the next section offers a Taxonomy of Relationships (with
illustrative examples) to help identify and police the boundaries of
competencies of science and moral reasoning for public bioethics.
242 For a review of competing approaches, see MEILAENDER, supra note 13, at ch. 1.
Also, see TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 1-
35 (2003), for a similar (if differently presented) discussion.
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B. Policing the Boundaries: A Taxonomy of Relationships
Identifying and policing the boundaries of science and moral
reasoning within public bioethics depends, for reasons discussed
above, on understanding the relationship between the public question
asked, and the kinds of answers that science is prepared to supply. To
facilitate such understanding, these relationships can be expressed
formally in a taxonomy divided into three parts, namely, the
"relationship of identity" (where the public question is empirical, and
thus asked in the same form as other matters of scientific inquiry); the
"relationship of complementarity" (where the public question is
ultimately normative, but its adjudication requires the mastery of
certain scientific factual predicates); and the "relationship of
preemption" (where a scientific claim is made about an ethical concept
crucial to resolving the public question under consideration). Locating
a public question within the taxonomy provides analytic clarity and
may yield insight into how to structure (or critique) public
decisionmaking. The taxonomy and its components are discussed
more fully below, with examples provided for purposes of illustration.
1. The Relationship of Identity and the (Imperfect) Case of Plan B
It is imaginable that a public bioethical question could be posed in
the same form to which modern science is accustomed. That is, it is
possible that a public bioethical question could be, at bottom,
narrowly empirical and thus answerable by the methods of science.
Such a question would thus fall into the first category of the taxonomy
- the relationship of identity. Examples of these kinds of questions
are exceedingly difficult to find, given that most public bioethical
matters involve some species of normative disagreement. There is,
however, an example (albeit an imperfect one) that illustrates this
relationship: the relatively recent dispute over the FDA's approval of
levonorgetrel (sometimes called "Plan B" or "emergency
contraception") for over-the-counter (OTC) sale to people older than
eighteen years of age.
Levonorgestrel is a synthetic hormone (similar to progesterone) that
has been approved as a post-coital means of preventing an unwanted
pregnancy.24 3 It is produced and marketed by Barr Pharmaceuticals
under the brand name Plan B. It was approved for prescription use in
243 See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
approved dosage is "two pills taken 12 hours apart, each containing 0.75 mg of
levonorgestrel" and "[It is commonly referred to as a 'morning after pill' ").
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the United States in 1999.24 It is not entirely clear how Plan B
prevents pregnancy. The approved labeling reflects this uncertainty:
Plan B® works ... mainly by stopping the release of an egg
from the ovary. It is possible that Plan B® may also work by
preventing fertilization of an egg (the uniting of sperm with
the egg) or by preventing attachment [of the newly conceived
embryo] (implantation) to the uterus (womb), which usually
occurs beginning 7 days after release of an egg from the ovary.
Plan B® will not do anything to [an embryo] already attached
to the uterus. The pregnancy will continue.
2 45
There are no known serious or long-term side effects associated with
Plan B (though it may cause nausea or abdominal pain in some
cases) .246
There has been a pitched moral disagreement over the use of Plan
B.24 7 Supporters of Plan B argue that it provides enormous social
benefits by effectively preventing unwanted pregnancies (and thus
abortions) following unprotected sexual intercourse. The principal
objection to the use of Plan B is raised by those who regard the
intentional (or negligent) destruction of human beings at the
embryonic stage of development as a grave injustice (for the same
reasons discussed above regarding objections to embryonic stem cell
research). They argue that use of the drug is morally unacceptable
because it might cause the death of a living human embryo by
preventing its implantation in the uterus.2 48 It is no answer, such
244 See id. at 522-23.
245 Barr Pharmaceuticals' Plan B Labeling, http://www.fda.gov/CDER/drug/infopage
planB/default.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
246 See Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
247 See Russell Shorto, Contra Contraception, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2006, http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/magazine/07contraception.html? (describing arguments
for and against Plan B); ABC World News Tonight: Report on the "Morning After Pill"
(ABC television broadcast May 8, 2006), available at http://mediamatters.org/
research/200605100014.
248 That is, the drug might work as an "interceptive" (killing the newly conceived
but as-yet-unimplanted embryo) rather than a "contraceptive" (preventing the union
of gametes - egg and sperm - and thus preventing conception). See U.S.
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, DIGNITAS PERSONAE 5-6, available at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/Dignitaspersonae/DignitatisVatican-Summary.pdf for a
discussion of this distinction and its moral implications; see also U.S. CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Dec. 5, 2003, COMMENTS ON FDA PROPOSAL TO CHANGE EC FROM
PRESCRIPTION TO OVER-THE-COUNTER, available at http://www.usccb.org/ogc/ec-
fda.shtml (raising additional concerns, including argument that widespread access to
Plan B will promote unprotected sex, thus leading to spread of sexually transmitted
diseases).
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opponents argue, merely to observe that Plan B prevents pregnancy
(medically defined as implantation of the embryo in the uterus) and
prevents abortions because the drug might do so by causing the death
of a living human organism (namely, the unimplanted embryo). Some
supporters of Plan B take issue with the empirical claim that Plan B
prevents implantation (and thus destroys newly conceived
embryos).249
The public bioethical debate about Plan B, by contrast, is
significantly narrower - relating to whether and to what extent the
FDA should approve Plan B for over-the-counter (OTC) sale. In 2001,
a large array of organizations filed a Citizen Petition seeking an FDA
rulemaking to switch Plan B from prescription-only to over-the-
counter status without restrictions.250 Two years later, the original
Plan B sponsor (Women's Capital Corporation) submitted a
supplemental New Drug Application requesting the same (a
procedural request that does not require a rulemaking 2 1). In a long
and controversial process, the FDA reviewed these requests, denied
the Citizen Petition, but ultimately approved the drug for OTC
distribution in 2006, subject to an age restriction (i.e., it was not made
available OTC to anyone 18 years old or younger). The procedural
twists and turns are not necessary to recite here.252 Suffice it to say that
as with any political or legal issue touching and concerning the
beginnings of life and reproductive freedom, the matter was fraught
with controversy. Abortion rights supporters and some reproductive
health advocates have alleged that the FDA delayed approval because
of improper political motives. Recently, a federal court agreed and
vacated the FDA's denial of the Citizen Petition. 53 The Obama
Administration did not appeal the decision and announced that Plan B
would be available OTC to people 17 years old or older.254 Opponents
of Plan B decried this decision as the improper politicization of public
health.2 5
5
249 William Saletan, The Birds and the Plan B's, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2006, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2006/04/01/AR2006040100005.html.
250 See Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 523; Initiation of Administrative Proceedings,
21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a) (2009) (describing process of citizen petitions).
251 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c), (d) (West 2010); 21 C.F.R. § 314.71 (West 2010).
252 For an account of the approval process, see Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 524-38.
253 See id. at 550.
254 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UPDATED FDA ACTION ON PLAN B
(LEVONORGESTREL) TABLETS (une 24, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm 149568.htm.
255 See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Easing Access to 'Morning After' Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/health/23fda.html
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Despite the wide array of rich moral arguments made for and against
Plan B, the public bioethical question was quite narrow, and largely (if
not entirely) empirical owing to the function of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. Under the statute, the FDA ultimately approves drugs
for either prescription or over-the-counter (OTC) use. The decision on
which branding to require is determined as a technical matter of the
drug's safety and efficacy. The FDA must require prescription
dispensing of a drug that "because of its toxicity or other potentiality
for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures
necessary for its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of
a practitioner licensed by law." '256 Conversely, where an advisory panel
of "qualified experts" has recognized that a certain category of drugs is
"safe and effective for use" without medical supervision, those drugs
may be sold without a prescription.257 Here, "[s]afety means a low
incidence of adverse reactions.., under adequate directions for use...
as well as low potential for harm which may result from abuse under
conditions of widespread availability. '258 Safety must be proven by
"adequate tests by methods reasonably applicable," including those
showing "results of significant human experience during marketing." 259
Likewise, "[e]ffectiveness means a reasonable expectation that, in a
significant proportion of the target population, the pharmacological
effect of the drug, when used under adequate directions ... will
provide clinically significant relief of the type claimed. ''260 Effectiveness
must be shown by certain "controlled clinical investigations" described
in regulations implementing the FDCA.261
Even if a specific drug has been originally approved for only
prescription use, the commissioner of the FDA or an "interested
party," such as a drug sponsor, may submit a supplemental application
to "switch" the drug's status to allow for OTC dispensing.262 Such a
switch will be granted, and the drug "shall be exempted from
(quoting Wendy Wright's claim that "[plarents should be furious at the F.D.A.'s
complete disregard for parental rights and the safety of miniors").
256 Exemptions and Considerations for Certain Drugs, Devices, and Biological
Products, 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2006).
257 Procedures for Classifying OTC Drugs as Generally Recognized as Safe and
Effective and Not Misbranded, and for Establishing Monographs, 21 C.F.R.
§ 330.10(a) (2009).
151 Id. § 330.10(a)(4)(i).
259 Id.
260 Id. § 330.10(a)(4)(ii).
261 Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2010) (describing clinical investigations).
262 See 21 C.F.R. § 353(b)(3) (2009); Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522
(E.D.N.Y. 2009).
1596 [Vol. 43:1529
20101 Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration
prescription dispensing requirements when the Commissioner finds
that such requirements are not necessary for the protection of the
public health by reason of the drug's toxicity or other potentiality for
harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures
necessary to its use, and he finds that the drug is safe and effective for
use in self-medication as directed in proposed labeling."26 3 Thus, the
driving consideration for whether to switch a drug from prescription
to OTC status is essentially whether its use under the proposed
labeling will meet the safety and effectiveness standards set forth in
the regulations.
In evaluating these ad hoc branding switches, the FDA generally
requires two types of studies: studies on the comprehensibility of the
proposed labeling, and others with data from "actual use" of the
medication. 264 Generally, if these studies (and any other available
material) show the drug to (1) have an acceptable safety profile based
on prescription use and experience; (2) have a low potential for abuse;
(3) have an "appropriate safety and therapeutic index"; (4) have a
positive benefit-to-risk assessment; and (5) be for a condition that is
"self-recognizable, self-limiting, and requires minimal intervention by
a health care practitioner," the requisite safety and effectiveness are
met, and the switch is approved.265 In short, once the scientific data
appropriately shows that a drug is effective and physiologically safe in
self-administration, prescription-dispensing requirements are
removed.
Based on the taxonomy proposed in this Article, the controversy
surrounding Plan B involves a "relationship of identity." By operation
of the FDCA (and related regulations), the decision to switch Plan B
from prescription to OTC is largely a question that is answerable by
empirical means - namely, by undertaking the comprehensibility and
actual use studies noted above. "Safety" and "efficacy" are certainly
concepts with ethical content, but this content has been largely
stipulated by the extant legal framework. What counts as a "harm" or
a "benefit" has been clearly defined in advance of the debate.
Nevertheless, the case of Plan B is imperfect in important respects.
First, the narrow empirical scope of the question is somewhat artificial
insofar as it is imposed by the statute itself. Moreover, as Rebecca
263 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2010) (emphasis added).
264 See Barbara Chevalier, The Constitutionality of the FDA's Age-Based Plan B
Regulations, 22 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 243 (2007).
265 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, F.D.A.: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL
OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS
UNUSUAL 7 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf.
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Dresser has noted, "value judgments are implicit in any FDA approval
decision because determinations about a product's safety depend
partly on judgments about the importance of the benefit it offers." 266
In the Plan B context, this ex ante moral judgment can even influence
how one regards the empirical dimension of approval: "People who
see unwanted pregnancy as a serious harm are more likely to consider
Barr's study data adequate, while those worried about preserving
traditional norms surrounding marriage and procreation are more
likely to find the data deficient.
267
Notwithstanding these imperfections, the recent case of Plan B's
switch to OTC status serves as a rough illustration of relationship of
identity. The import of this designation for the problem of integration
will be discussed below.
26
2. The Relationship of Complementarity and the Case of Federal
Funding for Embryonic Stem Cell Research
The second division of the taxonomy - "the relationship of
complementarity" - designates those questions in public bioethics
that finally seek to resolve a contested normative dispute, but also
require the mastery of certain background scientific matters. In this
case, modern science can and indeed must be integrated in order to
clarify the empirical dimensions of the dispute as a prerequisite to
sound moral deliberations (about which the science is, by design,
silent). Thus, this use of science facilitates clear and rigorous ethical
deliberations, but it cannot offer a resolution. It would seem that the
vast majority of questions in public bioethics present this relationship
of complementarity.
The paradigm example of this relationship is the case of federal
funding for embryonic stem cell research. For reasons discussed
extensively above,269 the ultimate questions presented by this public
bioethical issue are normative. Who counts as a "person"? Whose
good counts as part of the common good? Who decides and according
to what criteria? How do these questions stand in relation to the
humanitarian aspirations of scientists? How do they stand in relation
to the freedom to conduct scientific inquiry for the sake of itself?
What weight should be accorded to the consciences of taxpayers asked
266 Rebecca Dresser, Plan B Politics and Values at the FDA, Again, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT, Nov-Dec. 2004, at 9, 10.
267 Id.
21 See infra Part V.C.1.
26 See supra Part 111.
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to fund embryonic stem cell research? What do the obligations of
citizenship dictate? What about respect for pluralism?
At the same time, reasoning rigorously and clearly about the moral
status of human embryos requires a sophisticated understanding of the
biological properties of the embryo. The ethical debate also requires a
scientifically sound understanding of the present and projected
applications of embryonic stem cell research. But, it must be reiterated
that none of these empirical details settle the ethical questions
outlined above.27°
The import of locating a public question within the relationship of
complementarity for integration will be discussed below.27" '
3. The Relationship of Preemption and the Case of Cognitive
Neuroscience and Capital Sentencing
The third and final division of the taxonomy is the "relationship of
preemption," covering those instances in which a scientific claim is
made about an established ethical principle (or set of principles)
crucial to public bioethical deliberations. That is, this relationship
presents itself when the claims of science and the claims of ethics seek
to occupy the same explanatory space. Not surprisingly, this often
presents a conflict in which a scientific account is offered that reduces,
radically redefines, or nullifies altogether a longstanding ethical
concept. Resolution of this conflict determines whether the public
question is ultimately empirical or normative (and whether, by
extension, it is rightly understood as featuring the relationship of
identity or complementarity). This presents the most difficult and
interesting array of problems for integrating science into public
bioethics.
The paradigm example of the relationship of preemption in public
bioethics is the question of how to integrate cognitive neuroscience
into the criminal justice system - more specifically, in the context of
capital sentencing. Cognitive neuroscience, put simply, seeks to
understand how the brain enables the mind.272 Like other modern
scientific disciplines, it seeks and offers explanations in purely
270 There are some who have expressed the hope that science might someday
render the ethical conflict moot by developing fully pluripotent cells in a way that
does not require the use and destruction of human embryos (or even human ova). It
may be possible that the newly developed IPS cells (discussed above) will provide
such a scientific solution to this ethical problem.
271 See infra Part V.C.3.
272 For a full discussion of cognitive neuroscience as a field, including its premises
and methods, see Snead, Neuroimaging, supra note 19, at 1273-96.
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physicalist, reductive mechanistic terms that strictly observe well-
defined epistemic rules.273 Some prominent cognitive neuroscientists
(and sympathetic philosophers) have argued for a "radical conceptual
revision of criminal punishment itself" based on their work:
[M] ore specifically, they seek to use the premises and tools of
neuroscience - and neuroimaging in particular - to
embarrass, undermine, and ultimately overthrow retributive
justice as a principle of punishment. Once retribution is
discredited, they contend, criminal law will be animated solely
by its proper end: namely, the purely forward-looking,
consequentialist goal of avoiding socially harmful behavior.
This new approach, it is hoped, will usher in a regime of
"therapeutic justice," wherein criminal defendants will be
treated more humanely.274
This call to change the law is driven by ostensibly scientific claims
about ordinary conceptions of free will that undergird the ethical
concept of moral responsibility on which capital sentencing (indeed
all criminal punishment) is largely erected. Two of the most
prominent defenders of this view are neuroscientist Jonathan Cohen
and philosopher Joshua Greene:
Greene and Cohen argue that advances in cognitive
neuroscience - enabled by neuroimaging - will ultimately
demonstrate that "ordinary conceptions of human action and
responsibility" are false. "[A]s a result, the legal principles we
have devised to reflect these conceptions may be flawed" and
must be radically overhauled and replaced with principles that
are grounded in a neuroscientific view of the truth about free
will and human agency. The primary focus of their critique is
the principle of retributive justice - which, they assert,
"depends on an intuitive, libertarian notion of free will that is
undermined by science. "275
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess this argument and its
implications for capital punishment. 76 For present purposes it is
sufficient to notice that the argument illustrates the relationship of
preemption insofar as it purports to answer a public bioethical
question (about how to structure the capital punishment regime) by
273 See id. at 1277-80.
274 Id. at 1309.
275 Id. at 1309-10.
176 For such an analysis, see id.
[Vol. 43:15291600
2010] Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration
displacing a longstanding ethical concept (moral responsibility and
desert) with an ostensibly scientific one (hard determinism, grounded
in physicalism, and reductive mechanism). The significance of
locating this question within "the relationship of preemption" is
discussed immediately below.1
77
C. Applying the Taxonomy
The taxonomy of relationships discussed above is meant to provide
some measure of analytic clarity in the process of identifying and
policing the boundaries of scientific and moral reasoning within
public bioethics. Applying the taxonomy forces public officials to
think clearly about the kind of question under consideration. Is it
normative? Is it empirical? This may yield beneficial results to varying
degrees, depending on whether the question is a matter of first
impression, or whether it arises in the context of an extant legal
framework. For matters of first impression, the location of the
question within the taxonomy might suggest a rule of decision (e.g.,
whether and to what extent the matter should be delegated to
scientific experts for resolution). In those cases where the existing
legal regime already forces the question into one category, the
taxonomy allows a critical analytic distance necessary to assess the
wisdom of such an arrangement. For the hardest cases, the taxonomy
will allow a more focused and rigorous discussion of relevant
dimensions of the problem at hand. In this way, the taxonomic
approach is more flexible and responsive than the Maximal Deference
model, which locates all public bioethical questions in the relationship
of identity.
1. Generating a Rule of Decision for Public Matters of First
Impression
In those instances where the public bioethics question is a matter of
first impression, and there are no legal mechanisms in place for its
resolution, the taxonomy points toward a rule of decision. For
example, if the public question presents the relationship of identity
(i.e., the question is, at bottom, an empirical matter), then delegation
to scientific experts is fitting (provided that processes are in place to
preserve political accountability). It would be unwise governance to
allow those lacking the relevant disciplinary competence to resolve
such questions. If, by contrast, the public question is finally normative
277 See infra Part V.C.3.
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(as most seem to be in this domain), then its location within the
relationship of complementarity would dictate that it should be
resolved by political means by public officials accountable to the
polity. Conversely, such questions manifestly should not be delegated
to politically unaccountable experts for resolution merely by the
premises and methods of modern science.
The case of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research here
provides a useful illustration yet again. Applying the taxonomy
requires public officials first to engage in sustained critical reflection
on the kind of question presented in order to locate it properly within
the taxonomy. For the reasons discussed extensively above,278 such
reflection reveals that the matter requires the mastery of scientific
information (e.g., embryology, regenerative medicine, etc.), but, at
bottom, the public question is finally normative, requiring the
resolution of a wide array of contested moral issues. Having reached
this conclusion and located the matter within the relationship of
complementarity, public officials are on notice that the issue should be
decided by politically accountable public officials, applying the
humanistic concepts of moral reasoning. More importantly, this
question should not be delegated to politically unaccountable scientific
experts to resolve solely with the tools of their disciplines.
2. Providing a Critical Perspective on Extant Legal Frameworks
For public bioethical decisionmaking that is currently conducted
within an extant framework by operation of law, the taxonomy
provides a useful analytic perspective from which to assess the wisdom
of such arrangements. Noticing where the existing legal mechanism
locates the question taxonomically forces critical reflection on whether
this prior judgment (and the rule of decision that it entails) is sensible.
Take, for example, the case of Plan B discussed above. Current legal
arrangements, namely, the FDCA and related regulations, channeled
this public bioethical decision into the relationship of identity. That is,
the range of considerations was restricted to largely empirical
questions of "safety" and "efficacy," to be determined by scientific
studies regarding comprehensibility and actual use. Understanding the
location of this question within the taxonomy provides insight into the
virtues and limits of the present legal structure.
The current arrangement has the virtue of drawing upon scientific
expertise to answer complicated empirical questions about how the
drug might be used without the direct supervision of a physician (and
278 See supra Part V.A.
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resulting public health consequences). These questions are, in fact,
empirical and admit of resolution by scientific means. However, the
approval regime does not make space for consideration of the full
range of ethical concerns raised by switching the drug's branding
status. Most obviously, the FDCA does not provide the opportunity to
debate and resolve the question of the moral status of the embryo, and
how to grapple with the uncertainty about Plan B's effect on the
process of implantation. One might conclude that this is as it should
be. Or one might come to the view that the statute should allow for a
richer conversation about these moral questions that are currently off
the table. In any event, applying the taxonomy promotes this kind of
beneficial reflection on the regulatory status quo.
3. Providing Analytic Clarity for the Hardest Cases
For the hardest cases, namely, those involving the relationship of
preemption, the taxonomy is meant to offer a measure of analytic
clarity. Applying the taxonomy allows decisionmakers to identify
these most vexed species of questions and puts them on notice that
they must closely examine the competing claims of science and moral
reasoning before settling on a process for resolving the public issue.
They must, in effect, decide whether the question really is empirical or
normative. Taking the example of cognitive neuroscience and capital
sentencing, decisionmakers must inquire whether the claim that free
will (and thus moral responsibility) is merely an illusion of the
structure and function of the brain is indeed an empirically
demonstrated scientific conclusion. Or, to the contrary, is this claim
by cognitive neuroscientists simply a repackaging and extension of an
undemonstrable axiom or metaphysical postulate of modern science
(for example, physicalism and/or reductive mechanism) ?279 Answering
this question will have important implications for how to structure
decisionmaking about the capital sentencing framework. If Cohen and
Greene are right, then this presents a relationship of identity, and thus
delegation is in order. If not, then the question should be retained by
politically accountable officials - as dictated by the relationship of
complementarity. Thus, while taxonomy does not directly resolve
these contested questions, it serves to provide focus and clarity to the
deliberative process.
279 The resolution of this question is far beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
For a good discussion of this question, see Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson,
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (on file with author).
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CONCLUSION
Public bioethics is still a relatively new area of law. More than
virtually any other domain of governance it combines in dramatic
fashion contested ethical claims with state action. For this reason,
conflicts within public bioethics, such as those over abortion,
embryonic stem cell research, end of life matters, and the relationship
between mind, brain, and behavior have captured the imagination of
the American public. Sound governance in this area depends on the
proper integration of science into public deliberations and
decisionmaking in this field. But identifying the appropriate model of
integration is no easy task. The Maximal Deference model (which
seemingly delegates all such matters to scientists to resolve solely by
the tools of their disciplines) is unsustainable. Its strong default rule of
delegation to elite enclaves of experts raises vexed prudential
questions about democratic accountability and thus legitimacy. But it
fails decisively in any event as a matter of principle because the
premises and methods of modern science are conceptually
incommensurable with the ethical principles that comprise the
currency of public bioethical deliberations. The costs of ignoring this
problem of incommensurability are grave in human terms. They
include smuggling unstated norms into the political deliberations (a
kind of deception), or worse still, flattening or abandoning humanistic
principles (such as equality, justice, beneficence, and even personhood
itself) that offer protection to the weak and vulnerable who are most at
risk for exploitation and harm in this context.
What, then, is the proper approach to the problem of integration?
Given the incommensurability of science and ethical reasoning,
integration is thus a function of defining and policing the boundaries
of their respective competencies. Line drawing here depends on clarity
regarding the fit between the public question asked and the capacities
of science to supply answers. Science should be deployed solely for
empirical, descriptive inquiries. Ethical reasoning, by contrast, is
fitting for normative disagreement. The tripartite taxonomy of
relationships - identity, complementarity, and preemption - is
meant to offer needed clarity, and in some cases may even point the
way towards the soundest process of decisionmaking. In this way, the
taxonomy is proposed as a tool for defending the integrity of science,
the legitimacy of government, and the continuing vitality of key
humanistic principles.
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